Topic area: World history
Sub-topic area: Colonial administrative policies and decolonisation
Key unit competence
Asses the African reactions towards European colonisation.
Introduction
Activity 5.1
Work in pairs.Using the Internet, textbooks and other historical sources of information;
1. Find out the different reactions by Africans towards European colonisation.
2 Were the reactions helpfuL to Africans?
3. Write down your findings in a notebook.
4. Discuss them in a class presentation.
When the Europeans partitioned Africa among themselves, they agreed at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 that any European nation claiming possession of an African territory must maintain effective occupation of the area by sending administrators to avoid being challenged by others. Britain and Germany, desirous of maintaining spheres of influence, but reluctant to take full administrative responsibilities over them, initially opted to use chartered commercial companies for these purposes.
The French, on the other hand, largely stormed their way into West Africa through the use of the military.
The African peoples, whose lands were the subject of all these manoeuvres, reacted violently to the provocation. Some of them reacted directly and immediately, as the Europeans attempted to establish colonial rule. Such reaction is referred to as primary resistance, and most reactions fall into this category. Others mounted a type of struggle which historians have called secondary resistance.
This had several characteristics. It took place, not in response to initial imposition to colonial rule, but afterwards, when its effects had become apparent. It succeeded in uniting many previously disunited states.
Forms and methods of resistance
Activity 5.2
Work in groups of three.
Use the Internet, textbooks and other historical sources of information to;
(a) Explain what resistance is using relevant examples.
(b) Research on the methods and forms of resistance.
(c) Reasons for resistance.
(d) Consequences of resistance.
(e) Compile an essay on the various aspects of resistance.
(f) Discuss them in a class presentation.
Resistance refers to the attempts by Africans to refuse the imposition of the colonial rule by the Europeans.
Primary resistance
This was direct confrontation by African communities at the invasion of Europeans into their land. They used force to expel the Europeans before they gained access to their land.A number of examples of primary resistance can be cited where African reaction immediately followed the arrival of Europeans.
Resistance against French in Mali and Senegal
From the 17th Century, the French, attracted by the trade in slaves, had made the Senegalese coast their base. Louis Faidherbe ruled Senegal as Governor from 1854 to 1861 and from 1863 to 1865. Faidherbe laid the foundation of France’s West African Empire thirty years before the European partition. He united the scattered and precarious French coastal settlements known as the Four Communes as part of a larger colony about a third of the size of modern Senegal. Faidherbe was opposed to the policy also pursued by the British at this time, of informal empire. For him commerce at the coast could only flourish with effective French occupation of the interior. During his two spells as governor of Senegal, Faidherbe was able to formulate the concept of French penetration of the interior designed to prevent any European nation from challenging the French pre-eminence in the Upper Senegal or from sharing the commercial advantages the French were seeking to develop from there.
Resistance of Al-Hajj Umar of Tukolor, 1857 – 60
Umar was a member of a Fulani ruling clan. In the true tradition of a good Muslim, he had made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1820. Colliding with the Muslim chiefs of his area in Futa, he had moved off to Dinguiry and declared a jihad against the peoples of the Sudan.
Causes of resistance
Knowing of the commercial ambitions of the French, he sought to prevent their domination of the hinterland of Senegal. Faidherbe, on his part, also sought to prevent Umar’s expansion westwards, and negotiated a demarcation between Umar’s and French territory, while secretly engineering rebellion in Umar’s sphere by selling arms to the latter’s enemies. Umar found himself unable to tolerate Faidherbe’s doublegame. Many of those armed by the french defected to his side and fighting started. In 1857 Umar’s forces were repulsed in an attack on Fort Medina. Frustrated, he turned to the river and brought French trade on the Senegal to a standstill.
Consequences and significance
Umar’s clash with French Imperialism was important in a number of ways:
It made the French realise that in the prevailing circumstances it would be unrealistic to be content with the creation of immobile states. The new policy must be establishment of expansionist colonies.
It also gave the French an idea of what they were up against in attempting to colonise the Senegalese hinterland. Although unable to dislodge the French, Umar was able to secure a demarcation showing his sphere of influence in 1860.
It is also significant to note that the French did not expand into Umar’s territory for the next fifteen years, and when they did they met with fierce resistance from Umar’s successors.
This later resistance was occasioned by the decision to construct a railway from Senegal to the Niger. The brain behind the project was Paul Soleillet, a man who had made a name for himself in France by proposing a scheme to build a railway from Algeria through Timbuktu to Senegal.
Reaction of Ahmadou Sekou of Tukulor, 1882-96
The Tukolor Empire had been created by Al Hajj Umar in 1862. Now, in the 1880’s, it was being ruled by Ahmadou Sekou, al-Hajj Umar’s son, and extended from the whole length of the Niger at Bamako to Timbuktu.
Causes of resistance
The French plans for a railway line was the main cause of this resistance. The railway was supposed to link up with the Niger through Sekou’s territory. Gallieni demanded surrender of Sekou’s territory on the Niger left bank, as well as French monopoly of trade on the Niger – a move that would definitely kill the middleman’s role of Sekou’s subjects. Yielding to these demands would have meant cooperating in the building of the SenegalNiger railway, which Sekou was not prepared to do.
Not wishing to show commitment too early, Sekou employed delaying tactics, and stalled Gallieni for ten months. To force an answer, the French occupied Kita, inside Sekou’s territory. Continuing his diplomatic game, Sekou gave the town away and agreed to give French the ‘most favoured nation’ status in trade. But he rejected the demands in their original wording.
In October 1881, he travelled to St. Louis to have his interpretation of the agreement ratified. When his mission failed, he repudiated the treaty and remained free for nearly two years, as the French were still pre-occupied with securing the Senegalese base.
Course of resistance
Early in 1883 the French struck. Bamako was captured, a fort erected, and preparation made for continuing the construction of the railway. “You have burst into our lands” complained Sekou to the French Commandant at Bamako, ‘without authorisation, with no right and without any respect for the treaties which bound us.’ The conquest of the Sudan had begun.Sekou, in anticipation of French attack on Segu, had moved to Nioro. In 1886, Gallieni captured Upper Niger, and Sekou now divided his empire into four provinces: he himself took Kaarta, centred at Nioro; he placed Segu under his son, Madan; Massina under his cousin Tijani; and Dinguiry under his brother Aguibou. The French resorted to divide-and-rule tactics. Gallieni signed a protection treaty with Aguibou.
Apprehensive, Sekou also feigned surrender to Gallieni’s protection. But Archinard succeeded Gallieni in 1888 and declared that he would have no protection treaty with Sekou: he would only work for his destruction. Sekou, pricked by Archinard’s obvious disregard to the importance of peaceful co-existence, attacked villages near Kayes and Medina. It was now Archinard’s turn to sue for peace - a request that Sekou relished in rejecting. But soon after this, Segu and Medina fell to the French forces.
Samori at this stage suggested an alliance with Sekou, seeing that even he was under grave French pressures. He warned Sekou of the tragedy of remaining divided, and suggested an attack on the French by Sekou from the north while he would attack from the south. Sekou arrogantly refused. Nioro, his capital, was captured. Then Sekou, badly subdued, asked for Samori’s help. But the request had come too late. In 1893, aided by Sekou’s treacherous brother, the French beat him at Korikori, and for the following three years he ruled only a tiny kingdom at Dounge. Later, he fled from the French advance and died in 1898.
Occupation and reaction in Dahomey
In the French occupation of West Africa, Dahomey was unique, for its occupation was driven by economic factors. Before the 1840s slaves had dominated Dahomean trade.
Reasons for resistance, 1890
After the 1860s palm oil replaced slaves and by 1880, two main Dahomean ports, Whydah on the West Coast and Cotonou to the east, were the exit points. The amicable, purely trade relations that had existed between the French and the Dahomeans began to be replaced by tensions in the 1880s, as the French demanded that Cotonou be handed to them. The French traders claimed that the town had been ceded to them in the 1868 treaties.
The Fon did not agree, accusing the French traders of forgeries of clauses concerning Cotonou.In November 1889 the French governor of Rivieres du Sud Dr. Jean Byole, was sent to Abomey to demand from the crown prince that Dahomey should immediately hand over Cotonou to the French. When Prince Kondo would not co-operate, Byole ordered for the forceful occupation of Cotonou and the arrest of all the Fon administrators there. The excuse for the attack was that the Fon were planning to attack the French installations and had already taken French merchants as hostages at Hueda. In 1880 the French invaded Cotonou, but were repulsed by the Fon army.
Results of resistance
A French missionary Father Dorgere was sent to Abomey to negotiate for peace. By the subsequent settlement, Cotonou was recognized as French and the French had to pay an annual tribute of 200 Francs to the Fon king as compensation for loss of revenue from Cotonou. The expelled Fon administrators were to be allowed back into the town to look after the affairs of the Fon.
But this peace agreement did not take care of another area causing much friction between the French and the Fon in the 1880s. This concerned Porto Novo, a Dahomean petty state under Dahomean authority as its satellite since the 1820s. The French now purported to offer Porto Novo protection, directly challenging Dahomean authority and political influence in an area of such great economic and strategic importance.
The so-called peace treaty over Cotonou had substantial opposition from both sides. Some Fon leaders felt that the French exploitation, when they had not been defeated in battle, was unacceptable. On their part, some of the French felt that the payment was too high while just a little more effort would have won them full control of Dahomey. In 1892 the two sides went to war again. The Yoruba captives of earlier conflicts took advantage of the war to stab their former captors, the Dahomeans, in the back. Some retreated back to their home country, looting and destroying property as they did. They attacked villages and diverted the attention of the Fon from the on-going war against the French. King Ben Hazan sued for peace and surrendered. The French forces occupied Abomey. In 1894 the French colonised Dahomey and appointed a puppet king.
The wars of resistance in Ivory Coast
The colonising powers often found it much more difficult to conquer on a small scale societies, which resisted village by village, than they did to conquer much larger, unified states. The Ivory Coast was such a state, where the small coastal-forest states staged the most coherent, and, along with Samori Toure, the fiercest struggle against subjugation anywhere in West Africa. They resisted for all of twenty-seven years.
At the outbreak of Franco-Prussian war and subsequent defeat of the French in 1871, the French garrisons were withdrawn from the Ivory Coast. French interests were left in the hands of the merchant firm of Arthur Verdier. Treaties were signed in which the French merchants were given trading rights in return for an annual tribute to the coastal chiefs. Verdier honoured the treaties and sold his goods from the Grand Bassam and Assinie.
The major markets were in the interior, to which coastal people carried French goods and where the products of the savannah and of the forest, as well as the gold of Asante, were exchanged. Between 1887 and 1889, the French negotiated similar tributary treaties with the forest chieftaincies and as far north as Kong in the savannah. By the treaties the French bound themselves not to interfere with African customs, land tenure and or government.In occupying the area the French took no time at all to violate the treaties. They adopted the tactic of using the chiefs to sign treaties and then eliminating them in order to set up direct administration.
They demanded slave porters, meddled in the election of chiefs, and dispatched two military expeditions to strike at Samori in the north, which failed partly as a result of the hostile opposition. This especially came from the especially of Baoule people. In retaliation Samori sacked Kong, France’s ally and by this the French were proved vulnerable and more groups joined the Baoule in harassing them. The colony was however, established in 1893 and French control seemed well-established by 1900. In 1908 Angoulvant became Governor of the Ivory Coast.He was a man who was determined to be tough and who attributed French humiliation to the softness of his predecessors. He began a policy of systematic military conquest with the purpose of disarming the population.
Course of resistance
Despite the absence of centralised kingdoms like Asante, Benin and Dahomey, the small chiefdoms achieved exceptional co-operation in their resistance. While the French were preoccupied in suppressing one, two or three others arose to harass them. Because of the smallness of chieftaincies, there were no large armies against which the French could use their artillery. The forest provided an ideal environment for guerrilla ‘hit and run’ tactics. The people made a supreme effort to throw the French out of Ivory Coast and changed what had been a basically Baoule resistance into a general war of independence.
After the outbreak of the revolt Angoulvant was sent reinforcement from Senegal. The villages taken were burnt down. No pity was shown to prisoners. The severed heads were put on poles by the railway stations or in front of houses in the villages. Guns totalling 100,000 were confiscated, and this was a serious matter to the forest peoples who treasured them for hunting. Nearly 220 chiefs were deported, often being sent to the ‘dry guillotine’ of Mauritania. Taxes totalling about 30,000 pounds were imposed retrospectively; and forced labour and porterage exacted. Angoulvant waged a brutal war in which hundreds of villages were destroyed and their people herded into larger settlements. The French guarded these settlements to people from giving support to their fighting forces. One group formerly living in nearly 250 villages was forced into about twenty; another originally 147 was herded into ten.
Results of resistance
After years of military action, Angoulvant left the Ivory Coast in 1916. He left Africans of the forest zones of the Ivory Coast an exhausted, humbled and leaderless lot. Killings and deportations over the past twenty-seven years had almost wiped out the chiefly class. When the chiefs were destroyed the priests of the traditional religion attempted to lead the resistance. They, like the chiefs, failed. The people lost faith in the religion and the gods they represented. Military failure led to the collapse of political institutions and a weakening of faith in African religious beliefs and principles. It was in this political, religious and social chaos that a remarkable mass conversion to Christianity took place under a Liberian Christian preacher by name William Wade Harris.
Politically and economically the small chieftaincies were weak in contrast to the centralised states of West Africa. They could not raise large armies to be crushed by French firepower, nor depend upon walled cities which could be destroyed by French artillery. The wars therefore consisted of multiple risings, small groups striking and retiring, ambushing and cutting communication lines, so that the French found it difficult to profit by their military superiority. Africans were able to secure guns. The French capture of 100,000 firearms indicated a fairly reliable supply.
Reaction of Samori Toure of the Mandinka, 1882-98
Samori Toure was leader of the Mandinka in modern Mali. Samori first came into direct contact with the French in 1881. He was finally captured in 1898.
Reasons for resistance
Starting from Senegal, the French were expanding eastwards to the interior with the aim of conquering all of West Africa. Samori first felt their threat when they occupied Bamako. He resisted them for a number of reasons:
• The French threatened his independence, which he was determined to maintain.
• They threatened his commercial monopoly in the region.
• Being Christians, they were a threat to Islam.
• He himself was busy expanding his empire in the direction from where the French were advancing and the French stood in the way.
Course of resistance
Samori resisted the French from 1891 to 1898. He had a well organized army of about 35,000 men armed with repeater rifles, but not heavy artillery like the French.
He preferred the use of guerrilla warfare and fielded only part of his army at a time. Samori divided his army into three groups. The first was armed with repeater rifles, engaged the French and then retreated. The second organised the people, evaluated them and led them on their eastward exodus. The third conquered new areas for the settlement of the people.
As they moved, they carried out the scorched earth policy, burnt villages, crops and everything of value. When the French came they found nothing, no food, no shelter and no people. They therefore had to get their food supplies from further areas in the West and this delayed their pursuit of the Mandinka. This is why it took so long for the French to defeat Samori. By 1896, he had moved his empire about 600 miles to the east. After nearly seven years of war, Samori surrendered to the French in 1898.
Reasons for Samori Toure’s downfall
A number of factors explain Samori Toure’s fall:
(i) He was unsuccessful in winning British support against the French. Britain had decided that the Mandinka area was a French sphere of influence.
(ii) There were differences and lack of unity among African ruler. Samori did not get the support of his neighbours, such as Ahmadou Sekou of Tukolor, Tieba of Sikasso.
(iii) Samori was faced with local resistance due to his scorched earth policy and ruthless aggression against his neighbours. He thus dissipated his energy fighting the French and fighting wars of conquest in the east at the same time.
(iv) Non-Mandinka subjects – largely captives – were cruelly treated and did not give the right level of support against the French. They even tended to welcome the French, whom they saw as their liberators.(v) French troops were better armed and trained.
(vi) Shifting of the empire eastwards weakened him economically. He was cut off from the gold fields of Wangara where he used to obtain his gold.
(vii) amori was also cut off from Freetown where he used to buy firearms. So he had to rely entirely on his military workshops for supplies, which were not adequate.
(viii) The new empire was surrounded by the French and the British. The French attacked from the Ivory Coast; the British occupied Asante in 1896; the French had also occupied all the surrounding areas by 1898. Therefore Samori was stack at his second empire at Dabakala.
(ix) His troops suffered heavy losses.
(x) The empire was too large for himto manage effectively.
(xi) Samori was tricked into believing that if he surrendered, he would be allow safe conduct and quiet retirement in his home village. But the French did not keep their promise, and when he surrendered in 1898, he was deported to Gabon, where he died in 1900.
Results of Resistance
Samori’s resistance had the following results:
a) Samori lost his independence as the Mandinka empire was conquered.
b) There was a lot of loss of lives and property as a result of the war.
c) Samori was sent into exile in Gabon where he died in 1900 at the age of 70.
Occupation and reaction in Nigeria
By the mid 1870s the British possessed a firm political base in the island-colony of Lagos together with a strip of the adjoining coast. But the occupation of the rest of Nigeria was an extremely complex process, which brought the British into conflict with many indigenous communities. In her occupation of the coast and the Niger Delta, Britain had to contend with resistance by four African rulers. One of the better known of them was Jaja of Opobo.
Reasons for resistance
From 1884-1885, as Berlin Conference, Hewett began to sign protection treaties with the Niger Delta States. Protection treaties invariably purported to prevent the Delta states from making agreements with other European countries without the permission of Britain.
Jaja refused to sign these treaties as he saw them as potentially ruinous to his middleman’s position and to the sovereignty he had achieved with such effort. He also took a militant stand against missionary entry into his country.
He was determined not to end up like the king of Bonny whose warm embrace of European religion and support had reduced him to a spineless puppet in European hands and an embarrassment to his people. They began to solicit government support in gaining entry into Opobo. Many of the traders who had previously supported Jaja also now turned against him because he had held a firm monopoly of trade along his rivers and excluded them from the profits of the hinterland markets.
The British decided to move against him, firstly, to forestall the French intervention, and secondly to break Jaja’s middleman’s position and political arrogance. Jaja decided to relax his militant stand. In company with the other rulers of the ‘Oil Rivers’ signed a treaty in 1884 designed to give the legal basis for a British protectorate.
Course of resistance
On 8 June 1885, the Niger Coast Protectorate was born. The activities of the British made the King of Opobo switch on again his true attitude to foreigners. He drove the Miller Brothers’ factories away from the Qua Eboe rivers. The British now decided that Jaja’s power must be broken. Johnston tricked Jaja to board a ship upon which Jaja was arrested and deposed. He was subsequently deported to the West Indies where he died in 1891. Meanwhile, Opobo was effectively occupied by Johnston.
Nana Olumu of Itsekiri, 1883–94
Nana Olumu was elected Governor of Itsekiri in 1883. He was determined to deal with Europeans as equals, but not as their inferior. He incorporated Urhobos, Jamieson, Ethiope and Warri rivers into his trading empire by the use of force, friendship and marriage alliances.
The British, envying his control of these areas, offered him a treaty of protection in 1885. Nana signed it, but omitted a clause of commercial toleration to British traders in his empire. The British got the help of Dore Numa to stir up trouble in the empire in order to weaken Nana’s authority. Nana was invited but refused to meet the Consul. In 1894 an expedition under Moore was dispatched against him. Ebrohimi, his headquarters, was taken by the british. They found an unfinished canal and sophisticated assortment of munitions. All these were indicative of Nana’s modernising tendencies.
The Itsekiri Governor fled to the protection of the British Governor of Lagos, who handed him to the Commissioner of the Niger Coast Protectorate. He was charged with using ‘boys’ as slaves and blocking the highway of trade to British farms. He was found ‘guilty’ and deported to Accra.
Occupation by the British Government
The Royal Niger Company operated along the Niger and Benue rivers for many years before a formal British protectorate was proclaimed over Northern Nigeria. Its activities were essentially commercial. But during this time the Company entered into treaty agreements with a number of emirates. Some of these treaties gave it some form of political authority over the emirates. The British government produced these treaties before the European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885 to achieve it’s recognition of Northern Nigeria as a British sphere of influence.
The area of Northern Nigeria was also envied by the French. The only way by which the British could ensure that no other power seized control of it was by establishing a proper system of administration. It was felt that the Royal Niger Company could not, in the circumstances, undertake proper administration of the area. In 1899, its charter was revoked, and the British Colonial office assumed its powers.
Reasons for resistance
On 1 January 1900, Lugard hoisted the Union Jack in Lokoja. This gestured the beginning of British rule in Northern Nigeria. It was already declared a British Protectorate. Lugard became its first High Commissioner. But the people of Northern Nigeria had not asked anybody to rule them and now firmly refused to recognise the declared ‘right’ of the British. They wanted to maintain their independence and deeply rooted faith. As Muslims, they were enjoined by the Quran not to allow themselves to be ruled by unbelievers.
The Europeans, whether Christians or not, were non-Muslims. The Caliph’s stand, expressed in a reply to a British letter, sums up the attitude of all the emirates in the North.I do not consent that anyone from you should ever dwell with us. I will never agree with you. I will have nothing ever to do with you; between us and you there are no dealings except as between Muslims and unbelievers – war as God Almighty has enjoined on us. There is no power save in God on high. Consequently, wars were fought between 1900 and 1906.
Course of resistance
Yola, Bida, Kontagora, Kano, Sokoto, Bauchi, Bornu, Katsina, Zaria and many others preferred to fight for their faith and freedom rather than surrender willingly to British rule. Some of the emirs who did not fight to the death tried to escape. This was not cowardice, for flight in circumstances such as these was also borne out of faith.Prophet Mohammed himself had gone on such a flight in the famous ‘Hijra’. Islam permitted flight from infidel rule rather than acceptance of it. Muslims had the option to fight or flee when threatened by infidel conquest.
The most spectacular flight of all was that of Attahiru I, the Caliph at the time of the British conquest. Realising that Sokoto would fall to the British, Attahiru decided to evacuate the city with his officials, emirs and property. The British pursued him. After five months of constant pursuit Lugard’s forces caught up with the Caliph at Burmi in July 1903. Here a fierce battle was fought, at the end of which 690 men lay dead.
The Hinterland theory by Lord Lugard
The Berlin Agreement of 1885 only settled the question of the African coastline. As Lugard later pointed out, this led to confusion and disagreements on the interior.‘Since the Conference had refused to deal explicitly with the acquisition of territory other than coast lands, “the hinterland theory’’ – made in Germany – which had not the sanction of the Berlin Act or any precise definition, gradually received acceptance in so far as the “rights’’ of the European Powers and their relations towards each other in the partition were concerned.
By this dictum a Power in possession of coast lands was entitled to claim the exclusive right to exercise political influence for an indefinite distance inland. Obviously in a very irregularly shaped continent no method could be more calculated to create difficulties, and the climax seemed to have been reached when France claimed to restrict the frontiers of Nigeria, on the ground that they formed the hinterland of Algeria on the Mediterranean.‘The Powers, in their haste to declare their “spheres of influence’’ which they had claimed, had no time in some cases time to go through the formality of making treaties with the natives.
They and considered it sufficient to notify that they claimed the areas as hinterlands, or because they had some special interest in them. They were vaguely demarcated by lines of longitude and latitude regardless of tribal limits, or by reference to physical features which later exploration sometimes proved to be scores of miles from their supposed position, or even non-existent.
Results of resistance
For the devout Muslims defeat at the hands of the infidel was a terrible but not an overwhelming experience. Shortly after the fall of Kano, but before the capture of Sokoto, the emir of Kano wrote to the waziri (Vizier or chief minister) of Sokoto: I have found no more useful plan for all Muslims.... than that we leave this countryall of us ... as dogs ( i.e. the Christians) have surrounded us and threaten to overcome us.
For those who could not take the path of ‘hijra’ and were therefore forced to accept alien rule and even to collaborate with the infidel conquerors, an alternative line of action was permissible – taqiyyaor dissembling in order to preserve the faith. ‘This is legal in every land where Islam is not strong’, wrote a learned Sheikh of Sokoto, to whom the waziriturned for advice after the British conquest.
We show regard to them with the tongue and have intercourse with them in affairs of the world but never to love them in our hearts or adopt their faith.This attitude soon brought satisfactory results. The British were uneasy conquerors, haunted by fears of Mahdist insurrections, of the ‘fanatical’ Muslim Jihads. They were scrupulous in avoiding any gesture likely to offend Muslim sensibilities. In time many members of the Fulani aristocracy reconciled themselves to the British presence. A prominent Sokoto Fulani, later to become the premier of Northern Nigeria wrote
:The British were the instruments of destiny and were fulfilling the will of God ... They made no drastic changes ... everything went on more or less as it had done, for what could the resident, an assistant and a few soldiers in Sokoto do to change so vast an area as Sokoto Emirate?With the conquest of the Caliphate, Britain completed its occupation of Nigeria.
Resistance of Kabalega of Bunyoro, 1893
Omukama Kabalega of Bunyoro was always everything the British based in Buganda would be cautious with. He was economically and militarily strong, thanks to his lucrative relations with the Khartoumers from the north. He was aclose rival of the Kabaka of Buganda and not only a Muslim convert but also a dangerous rallying point for the Muslims in the region. In Lugard’s travels to the west, he had made agreements with Toro and Ankole but had not gathered courage to enter Bunyoro, which remained independent and a threat to British interests in Uganda.
Reasons for Bunyoro campaign
Meanwhile, in Buganda Captain JRL Macdonald had been left by Portal to act as British representative there. Macdonald continued to have problems with Baganda Muslims. Although they had been defeated in the first clash, they now lay astride Macdonald’s communications with the west and some of them were trying to get in touch with the Sudanese garrison in Toro.
Kabalega, too, was threatening Toro, certainly encouraged by signs of withdrawal of the Sudanese garrisons. He was emboldened further by the middleman trade in guns and ivory between the Acholi.
German East Africa, and Arab traders had established themselves in Bunyoro. Ntare of Ankole also appeared to be permitting caravans of gunrunners to pass through his territory in spite of his agreement with Lugard. In these circumstances, Owen was at a loss what to make of his orders to withdraw, and wondered what provision had been made to protect the Batoro. Owen delayed and angered Macdonald.
Macdonald was driven to be more decisive. in September 1893, he recognized the need to campaign against Kabalega. Owen was authorized to prepare an advance from the south while Macdonald gathered his forces for the main attack. In November, Colonel H. E. Colvile arrived to take over from Macdonald with instructions to check a rumoured Belgian advance into the British sphere in the direction of the Nile.
Macdonald’s proposed campaign fitted in well with these orders and Colvile took command of the expedition, which consisted of the Sudanese troops together with a vast number of the Baganda. The advance began in December 1893. Within a month Kabalega’s capital near Hoima was occupied. Although the Mukama continued to wage a guerrilla campaign for nearly a year he was finally driven to take refuge north of the Nile in November 1894.
Results of the campaign
A small occupation force was left in Bunyoro to prevent any revival of Kabalega’s influence, but no formal annexation was made. As a reward for their part in Kabalega’s overthrow the Baganda were assisted in annexing large areas in the east and south-east Bunyoro, the most important of these being Mubende. This was the former centre of the Kingdom of Kitara and the burial place of former rulers of Bunyoro.
Major Owen went down the Nile to Wadelai where he induced the local chief, Ali, to accept protection. On returning to Toro he restored to office Mukama Kasagama who had been driven out by Kabalega. Mukama sought refuge in the foothills of the Ruwenzori Mountains. Owen then made another agreement with the young ruler, which guaranteed British protection in return for the acceptance of a British Resident in Toro.
A similar agreement was made in August between Major Cunningham and the Mugabe of Ankole. Both treaties had been signed on behalf of the British Government yet neither had been authorized by the Government.
The Nandi resistance, 1895-1906
Soon after the proclamation of the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, the construction of the Uganda-Railway began in 1896. The Railway had to pass through the Nandi country, and it was during its construction that the British first came face to face with the Nandi.
Reasons for resistance
The Nandi resisted for a number of reasons:
(i) Nandi Pride. The Nandi in recent years had experienced a series of successes in their raiding expeditions. They had come to believe in their superiority, both military and cultural, over the neighbouring tribes and everybody else. In entering the Nandi country with an air of superiority, as they did, the British were doing something that none of the Nandi neighbours would have dared. This was a serious threat to their pride by a foreign people, which had to be repulsed.
(ii) Appearance of Europeans. Europeans were thought to be devils for their clothes and skin colour. This view was confirmed by the sound made by their guns when fired. The sound was similar to that made by Nandi women when they hit their skin skirts during a tribal dance. A conclusion was thus reached that these European devils were of the female variety and should therefore be expelled instantly.
(iii) Kimnyole’s Prophesy. Kimnyole arap Turukat had been an Orkoiyot, a central figure in the Nandi community with social and often political functions. Kimnyole had prophesied that foreigners would one day rule the Nandi. One day, he said, there would come a big snake from the eastern lake (which turned out to be the Indian ocean), belching smoke and fire, and going to quench its thirst in the western lake (which turned out to be Lake Victoria). The ‘snake’ turned out to be the railway and the train, whose construction greatly worried the Nandi. The Nandi had sworn to resist this occurrence, and now fought an all-out war to protect their country.
(iv) Aftermath of Peter West’s Murder.In 1895, the Nandi murdered a British traveller called Peter West who tried to cross their country. It was this event that sparked off over eleven years of fighting between the Nandi and the colonial government. Peter West had pitched his camp one evening by a running stream within the escarpment forest. The Nandi crept upon the encampment unseen, murdered West, killed 23 of his porters and looted their trade goods. The murder of Peter West was in revenge for punishment Peter West’s employer, Andrew Dick, had inflicted on them for stealing some of his cattle.
Course of Resistance
When news of the murder of West reached Mumias, and further news that the mail party had been attacked by the Nandi, the mail burnt and the boxes stolen, the colonial government decided to act against the Nandi.
On 14th October 1895, Cunningham left Kampala with 1000 Sudanese and Baganda troops, who arrived in the Nandi country, and started fighting. Another column led by Colonel Trevor Ternan assembled another attacking expedition to Nandi. But this was unsuccessful and the expedition was forced to return to deal with unrest in Buganda. In spite of the two fighting expeditions that had invaded their country the attitude of the Nandi and Tugen showed little change.
They were determined to maintain their independence by keeping foreigners away from their borders. Raids on the Maasai and other nearby ethnic groups were stepped up. Mail-runners and isolated strangers from caravans were still attacked and murdered. Several soldiers on the Uganda road were killed and their rifles stolen.
In these struggles against the British, the Nandi had a number of advantages from their environment. Firstly, their country was mountainous and broken by numerous rivers, many of which had steep, heavily wooded valleys. Secondly, large areas were covered with thick forest containing glades where cattle could graze, as well as deep holes where they could be hidden. These conditions were ideally suited for guerilla warfare and allowed both men and animals to be hidden. Big guns could not be used in these conditions and even the effectiveness of rifle power was reduced.
The maintenance of unity among the Nandi was moreover encouraged by the appointment of Orkoiyot Koitalel arap Samoei, to direct the war against the British. Samoei’s reputation and influence increased between the Nandi and the neighbouring people as warriors’ raids were regularly successful. Successive punitive expeditions left without forcing the Nandi to make peace and all attempts to capture them were frustrated. The British Officer in Nandi, Captain Richard Meinertzhagen was convinced that if the Orkoiyot were killed the resistance would be broken. He therefore arranged a meeting with Koitalel arap Samoei at the Orkoiyot’s home in October 1905. A stage-managed scuffle took place at the meeting and the Orkoiyot and most of his Maotik (advisors) were killed.
Results of resistance
Demoralised by their Orkoiyot’s death, the Nandi gave in to the massive firepower brought against them. Hayes-Sadler, the new Commissioner, met the Nandi leaders on 15 December 1905. They accepted the terms of peace, which included:
(i) The forced removal of the south-east Nandi clans (the Kamelilo and the Kapchepkendi) to a northern reserve away from the railway line. This was aimed at:
• The protection of the railway.
• The isolation of the Nandi from their cousins, the Kipsigis.
• The protection of the European farms in the area and the creation of peace for more European settlers.
(ii) The Nandi also ‘agreed’ to live peacefully under British rule.
(iii) In 1906 many European forts were built in Nandi country and effective British administration started.
Reasons why Nandi resistance took long
The Nandi resistance lasted almost ten years, certainly the longest resistance to colonial rule in East Africa. There were five main reasons for this:
(i) The Nandi were traditionally a fighting people, and even in peace times young men were known to indulge in dangerous practices with their weapons. So to some of the warriors, the presence of European strangers offered them the chance for a good sport.
(ii) The layout of the Nandi country made it possible for them to engage in guerrilla warfare, which the whites were unable to match. Besides, the high altitude of the country, consisting of many steep hills and cold forests, caused breathing problems, and was totally unfamiliar to the Swahili, Indian, Maasai and Somali soldiers fighting for the British.
(iii) The youthfulness of many of the warriors ensured that the resistance would be long-drawn. The rising–age group, the Kimnyige, wanted to establish themselves as respected leaders of the future, who could be depended upon to protect the community.
(iv) The British attempts to acquire allies from the Nandi’s immediate neighbours like the Kipsigis and the Nyang’oris were not successful.
(v) There were no elements of rivalry to power and no prominent leaders among the Nandi to negotiate with the British, as the British were accustomed to, elsewhere in Africa.
Reaction of Mkwawa of the Hehe, 1891-8
The greater challenge to German authority during the 19th Century came from the Hehe, who lived in the southern highlands of Tanzania. The Hehe emerged as a united people in the 1860s and 1870 when a local ruler, Munyigumba, asserted his power over 15 petty chiefdoms. By adopting the military tactics of the neighbouring Ngoni, the Hehe soon acquired a formidable reputation as warriors. Under Munyigumba’s son, Mkwawa, their raiding parties were striking eastward to the coast and northward to harry caravans using the important trade route between Bagamoyo and Tabora. In their dealings with the Maasai the British were faced with a declining power: the Germans, by contrast, found themselves confronted in the Hehe with a people still experiencing the first flush of successful expansion. Thus the Hehe-German relations soon presented the familiar pattern of a clash of rival imperialisms.
Reasons for resistance
The trade route from the Coast to Tabora and beyond passed through Mkwawa’s empire. He levied hongo on those who traded through or in his territory. The Germans were unhappy with reports of heavy hongo levied by Mkwawa or his vassals and saw a solution to this only in the subjugation of the Hehe chief.Mkwawa was aware that the invaders had no reason to like him, but at first hoped to amicably settle his differences with them. But he gradually became convinced that a ruler of his stature could not stomach the contempt the Germans had for him indefinitely. The manner in which von Wissmann summoned him to the Coast only confirmed his growing suspicion that the Germans did not respect him as a sovereign ruler. He retaliated by closing the trade route from Bagamoyo to Tabora. It had now become clear to him that a diplomatic solution with the Germans was impossible.
In preparation for a military confrontation, he unsuccessfully sought an alliance with Chief Chebruma of the Ngoni, and Isike of Tabora. He then got ready to meet the Germans.In June 1891 a German expedition led by Emil von Zewlesky, the commander of the Defence Force, set out from Kilwa Kivinje with three companies on a punitive expedition against the Hehe, who were persistently raiding neighbouring tribes. The Hehe chief, still hoping for a last-minute peaceful settlement, sent unarmed men with lavish presents to meet the visitors. The sight of Mkwawa’s men triggered a defensive and aggressive instinct in the Germans. They opened fire and several of the men died.
Course of resistance
On 16 August 1891 Mkwawa retaliated by ordering an ambush at Lula-Rugaro which overwhelmed the German expedition. Ten Europeans (including von Zelewski|) and some 300 askaris fell in action. Only four Europeans and sixty askaris survived. The Hehe captured three cannon and 300 rifles. This reverse seriously weakened the military strength of the Germans and was a grave blow to their prestige.But the Hehe also sustained heavy losses and Mkwawa decided to rely mainly on defensive tactics to counter the German threat. Accordingly he set about his capital, Kalenga, with a massive stone wall. The Hehe believed this wall to be undemolishable.
However, their confidence was misplaced and their tactics ill chosen. From the fort, Mkwawa attacked the German garrison at Kilosa, killing all the occupants, retreating to the fort. In 1894, the Germans, under Lieutenant von Prince stormed Kalenga. They destroyed its fortifications, and built a new post for themselves at nearby Iringa. The chief himself escaped and turned to guerrilla warfare. So great was the esteem and the fear in which the warrior-chief was held that he was able, though a fugitive, to resist the Germans for another four years. Eventually, tired and deserted, but determined to avoid the humiliation of captivity, Mkwawa shot himself in 1898.
The Germans beheaded his corpse, and the skull was sent to Berlin. The Hehe never forgot their leader, and constantly demanded the return of his skull. Finally in 1954, the British Governor, Sir Edward Twining, brought it back from Germany.Consequent upon this victory, the Germans disbanded the Wahehe chiefs’ council, demanded the exiling of resistance leaders, and imposed a heavy fine on the Hehe for having resisted.
Lobengula and the Ndebele War of 1893
In the run-up to the Ndebele War of 1893, three important events occurred in sequel, impacting on the relations between the British South Africa Company and Lobengula, king of the Matabele. The first was the Rudd Concession of 1888, in which the king was tricked into giving Cecil Rhodes’ Company exclusive charge over all minerals, situated and contained in Lobengula’s territory. Second and on the basis of these concessions, Rhodes obtained a charter from the British government for his Company to establish an administration over Lobengula’s territory. Third, these events opened the flood-gates for European influx in the area, followed by the BSA Company Pioneer Column’s entry of Mashonaland in 1890. The resultant sour relations between Lobengula and the Europeans eventually led to the outbreak of war in 1893.
Causes of the Ndebele War, 1893
The Ndebele War was caused by a conflict of interest between the BSA Company and the Ndebele over issues which included minerals, governance and land. Specifically, the causes included the following:
(i) The Rudd Concession. The Rudd Concession became immediately controversial. The BSA Company’s interpretation of the agreement was that the British company had obtained the right to establish an administration in Lobengula’s territory. Thus, in June 1891, police, magistrates and resident commissioners were introduced, Sir Archibald Colquhoun becoming chief magistrate in September, later to be replaced by Dr Starr Jameson. However, Lobengula vehemently rejected this interpretation, insisting that his understanding was that the British would come, dig for minerals and go home. He was prepared to go to war to stop the British treachery from taking effect.
(ii) British occupation of Mashonaland. The British occupation of, and conduct in Mashonaland spelt loss of control over a people that Lobengula had regarded as his subjects. This loss of control was emphasised when Lobengula sent 3,000 men to attack Shona villages west of Fort Victoria as a way of punishing the Shona for the offence of disposing of his cattle without following acceptable procedure. During this episode some Shona men, women and children fled into Fort Victoria for Company security. When the Ndebele indunas came to Fort Victoria to demand the handing over of the Shona, Lendy, the magistrate at Fort Victoria refused, and instead opened fire, killing 30 of them. The Ndebele were left with no option but to fight for their right.
(iii) Loss of land. The Ndebele were protesting against loss of their land. Rhodes had promised the initial 500 white settlers together with members of the BSA Company’s Pioneer Column who had accompanied them, large tracts of land on arrival; he had kept the promise and given them 3,000 acres each of Lobengula’s territory. The Ndebele were not ready to lose their independence and land to the British.
(iv) Protest against forced labour. The Ndebele hated forced labour imposed by British officials on white farms, mines and homes. This was made worse by the practice of the BSA Company personnel to inflict punishment on defaulters. Compelling people to work on some public utility and meting out punishment were a preserve of the king only.
(v) Incitement of the Shona. The Matabele were by their action an example of defiance attempting to incite the Shona to resist the whites.
(vi) Disregard for the Ndebele culture. The British undermined and disregarded the traditional values, customs and religion of the Ndebele. The war broke out in October 1893 when the Ndebele killed the Shona servants belonging to the whites. Ndebele resisting forces were broken up at Shangaan and Bembesi in late1893, and the Ndebele lost nearly 1,000 men, while others took their lives rather than return defeated. Ndebele prisoners were shot dead. In Bulawayo, Lobengula set fire to his kraal, and fled north, with Major Forbes and 142 men in hot pursuit. He had severe gout and died near the Zambezi River at the end of January 1894. Meanwhile Bulawayo fell and Matabeleland was occupied.
The Pioneer Column entered Mashonaland in July 1890 and reached Fort Salisbury in September. The Matabele war was now only yards away, though Lobengula had played nearly all his diplomatic cards in trying to avert the confrontation. The occupation of Mashonaland by the British illuminated to Lobengula very clearly the path of what was to come, and he knew that he now could do nothing more about it. He, in a famous simile, summed up his plight to the missionary, Helm, having tried his best to avert a violent confrontation to no avail:
‘Did you ever see a chameleon catch a fly? The chameleon gets behind the fly and remains motionless for some time, then he advances very slowly and gently, first putting forward one leg and then the other. At last, when well within reach, he darts his tongue and the fly disappears. England is the chameleon and I am that fly’.
And the events of 1893 more than vindicated his fears as the Matabele war started and the state was swept away.
Results of the War of 1893
The results of the war of 1893 included the following:
i. Defeat of the Ndebele. The Ndebele were defeated.
ii. Loss of lives. The war resulted in heavy loss of lives.
iii. Dismantling of Ndebele society. After the 1893 war there was a deliberate attempt to transform the whole structure of the Ndebele society, socially, politically and economically. The monarchy was abolished; the regimental towns were broken up and none of the Ndebele indunas was any longer recognized as an authority for the purpose of administration. The superior Ndebele caste, the Zanzi, was prevented from continuing to exert their authority over the Holi Caste by force.
iv. BSA Company occupation of Matabeleland. The Ndebele lost their independence as the BSA Company occupied Matabeleland and established their rule.
v. Loss of property. After the 1893 war the Ndebele lost nearly all their land and cattle. The whites who had defeated the Ndebele had been promised land and cattle, which they now got. The men who supported the Company in England were also rewarded with land grants.
vi. Creation of reserves. There was displacement of people from their original homes. Two reserves were created for Africans. The Gwaai Reserve, which was short of water and was very unsuitable for cultivation or grazing and the Shangaan Reserve, which was infested with tse-tse fly. The Ndebele had the choice of either living in these reserves or becoming squatters on European farms where they would pay rent in produce or in labour to avoid eviction.
vii. Introduction of forced labour. Forced labour, which had started in Mashonaland, was introduced in Matabeleland.
Occupation and reaction in Angola
The earliest Portuguese interests in Angola were limited to the coastal regions. Only their halfcaste slaving agents known as pombeiros ventured to the interior in search of slaves. And as long as the supply of slaves to the coast was adequate, the Portuguese were content with their hazy control of parts of Angola.
Although Portugal was the most backward country in Europe economically, the forces of industrialism which were growing in Europe, Africa and America, and causing a greater scientific interest to be taken in the African hinterland, drove Portugal also to send out its explorers to probe into the continent of Africa. This started from the Angolan coast and the coast of Mozambique. This sort of activity was stimulated by the general ‘scramble for Africa’ and the competition with other European powers.
Reasons for resistance
When the Berlin Conference met in 1884-5 Portugal was given authority over Angola and Mozambique. The problem now immediately facing Portugal was the problem facing the other Europeans in Central Africa, namely, the establishment of political control over the areas which they claimed and the production of local commodities to Europe. This required a greater degree of control and oppression by the Portuguese in Angola. These primary resistance struggles were especially pronounced in the extreme south and the extreme north of Angola, where they lasted until the First World War.
The Portuguese themselves admit the degree of resistance by the Angola peoples, when they speak of the endless wars of ‘pacification’ which they were forced to wage. Pacification of an area meant that the inhabitants had to work for the Portuguese in one way or another, mainly on construction projects, in obtaining rubber for export and in growing cash crops. With insufficient capital to allow for the payment of wages in a free labour market, the Portuguese favoured the continuation of forms of slave labour. In the face of increasing opposition from certain quarters in Portugal and elsewhere, the powerful slave – owning whites and mulattoes in Angola simply changed the designation from ‘slavery’ to ‘corrective labour’, which was punishment for so called ‘vagrancy’. Later, it became ‘contract labour’, which was rewarded with a small payment, but which was as inhuman as slavery. Angolans found contract labour hateful.
In 1890-91, the Behe chief Ndunduma blocked the main route from Luanda to Barotseland before Portuguese soldiers and Afrikaners won a bloody war for the possession of his country. But the first great revolt of the modern era took place on the Bie plateau in 1902, and mainly involved Ilundo people. They were losing their lands to the Portuguese, and they were unable to carry on with their own agriculture because the men, who traditionally worked in the field doing this heavy labour, were conscripted to work for the Portuguese. The Bailundo revolt under Mutu ya Kevela exploded in 1902 as protest against the excesses that had accompanied the recruitment of labour. A number of white traders were killed and their stores destroyed. The Portuguese troops from Benguela and Mofamedes marched against the fighters and the revolt was suppressed with utmost brutality. Thousands of Africans lost their lives and their villages were burned. But while it was in progress, it put a stop to all commerce and greatly worried the Portuguese because it spread far into the interior. By the end of 1903, the Bailundo revolt was over.
Elsewhere in Angola, Africans similarly resisted the establishment of colonial rule. In the South, the Cuanhama remained unsubdued between 1890 and 1910, during which time they inflicted a series of defeats upon successive Portuguese expeditions. In 1897 after they had refused to have their cattle vaccinated, Cuanhama warriors routed a Portuguese garrison. There was an interval of peace, but in 1904, the Cuanhama again attacked the Portuguese, persisting in their opposition until the Portuguese finally won a decisive victory over them near Rocades.
Between 1907 and 1910, Portuguese troops from Luanda had meanwhile captured the powerful chiefs of the Dembos region – where a modern revolution erupted in 1961 – and gradually subdued their numerous recalcitrant followers.Sao Thome experienced an even more vicious form of contract labour. Angolan workers were transported there to grow cocoa and coffee, and of the thousands who went there supposedly on fiveyear contracts none were allowed to return. The Sao Thome’s contract labour, alias slavery, brought protests from Britain, Germany and the United States, which prevailed over the Portuguese to terminate this neo-slavery in 1917.
But resistance of Angolan peoples to this system was even stronger than the international protest, especially in the Congo Province of Angola, where most of the Sao Thome’ workers were recruited by force. As early as 1913, fighting broke out in this region because of the export of labour and the armed protest continued until 1917. This confrontation is known, after the name of the leader, as the revolt of Tulante Bula.As we have already seen, secondary resistance took place, not at the point of the arrival of European occupation, but after they had long settled. A number of examples can be cited.
Occupation and reaction in Ghana (Gold Coast)
Asante has been variously described as an empire, a union, a confederation, a confusion that arises from the complex structure. The kingdom was founded in the latter half of the 17th Century, when a cluster of Akan speaking village states, lying in the forest country of central Ghana, formed a union, headed by the chiefs of Kumasi, to protect themselves against the attacks of their neighbours.
A succession of inspiring leaders guided the Asante union to become the most powerful military force in the area. The Asante paramount came to be accepted by other Akan states, and even non-Akan states like Dagomba and Gonja to the north began to pay regular tribute to the Asantehene (the ruler of Asante). By the beginning of the 19thCentury at least twenty states were tributary to Kumasi.
During the 18th Century the Asante confederation had expanded its empire into Fante-inhabited coastal area. In the following century the Asante persisted in their long-standing policy of attempting to trade directly with Europeans on the coast instead of through Fante middlemen. The Asante especially needed guns and powder both to defend their empire and to expand it, in exchange for gold and slaves. But they were concerned to maintain their hegemony over the small Fante states that adjoined the European trading settlements.
The Fante, however, were determined to preserve or win back their independence from the Asante. Nineteenth century Fante was divided into many small states and this political disunity made it difficult for the Fante to resist Asante attacks. The Fante sought British assistance to protect themselves against Asante aggression. In 1844 a number of Fante rulers put their signatures to a document formally acknowledging British ‘power and jurisdiction’. The ‘Bond’ of 1844 simply gave British officials the right to sit as assistants in African courts to hear certain cases in Fanteland and did not necessarily place the Fante under British jurisdiction.
At this time there were still several Dutch and Danish trading posts on the Gold Coast. By purchasing the Danish forts in 1850 and the Dutch in 1872, the British strengthened their hold on coastal areas, but by so doing they caused bitter resentment in Kumasi where the former Dutch fort of Elmina was regarded as being legally subject to Asante sovereignty, indeed owned by the Asante.
Occupation and reaction in Sierra Leone, 1896
Sierra Leone was founded in 1789 as a Colony for freed slaves. It was a small settlement with an exclusive ‘alien’ society, which initially had little contact with the hinterland. Two things compelled the British in the Colony of Sierra Leone to declare the hinterland of the present–day Republic a Protectorate in 1896. One was to protect and promote trade with the people of the interior of the colony and the other was to secure a peaceful atmosphere for trade in the interior. In agreeing to these appeals, Britain was influenced by two other factors. These were the expansion of the French sphere of influence and the territorial designs of Samori Toure. British action became imperative after the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.
In 1896, Governor Frederick Cardew (1894-1900) declared the interior a Protectorate, despite strong protests from the native kingdoms. The Protectorate was divided into five districts. Bordering on the Colony were three districts: Karene in the north-west, Ronietta in the West-Central, and Bandajuma to the South-East. Further in the interior were Panguma in the north-east and Koinadugu in the north.
A white district officer placed over each district administered his territory with the help of members of the Frontier Police, who kept order and peace. Members of the Force in remote places occasionally appointed chiefs of their own choice. Doing this was contrary to the traditions of the people. The traditional rulers were generally given a measure of freedom of action in their own areas but only under surveillance of the white district officer.
In 1898 disturbances began. These escalated into a war between the natives and the British. This armed conflict is referred to as the House (Hut) Tax War.
Causes of the House Tax War, 1898
The War of 1898 had long-term and short-term causes.
(i) The Creoles had been resented for a long time. They had taken advantage of their privileged position and training to monopolise the middlemen’s trade in the interior. They had experienced the greatest impact of missionary activity, controlled the educational sector and excluded the indigenous people from its benefits. They also not only claimed a monopoly of foreign culture, but also openly condemned and despised traditional beliefs and practices. They spoke ‘Krio’, a language incomprehensible to the indigenous people, branded everything traditional ‘barbaric’, and exhibited a superiority complex never before seen in the hinterland.
(ii) The Creoles also seemed to suffer from another kind of complex. The Frontier Police Force had been established in 1890, and the Creoles formed the bulk of it. But their background as ex-slaves or descendants of ex-slaves was made much of by the people of the interior and this made them uncomfortable. Because of their rejection they took to vengeance and bullied, looted and raped women in the interior. Resentment against them was almost universal.
(iii) Furthermore, the people regarded the taking over of their territory as a Protectorate without their consent as a usurpation of their ancestral lands and sovereignty.
(iv) To make matters worse, the British-appointed District Commissioners infringed on the traditional authority of the chiefs. The chiefs now being appointed had no traditional claim to chieftaincy, and their positions in fact became steadily debased. Any chief accused of ‘disrespect’ to his European or Creole superior was summarily tried, publicly flogged and imprisoned. The Frontier Police did not only take the law into their own hands, but they were also seen as agents of terrorism in the service of equally unacceptable alien rule.
(v) Chiefs were at the same time banned from participation in criminal or civil cases. And since the District Commissioners were ignorant of customary law, many Africans were imprisoned in a manner that did not conform to their sense of justice.
(vi) The administration itself was riddled with inefficiency and corruption. Owing to lack of personne. Some administrative powers were given to the Frontier Police, which was full of the hated and the hateful Creoles.
(vii) Also causing resentment was a new land policy. In 1896 a land ordinance was passed, that all mineral rights would come under the Crown, and that waste, or uninhabited lands should be allocated to settlers. The land policy overlooked the fact that Africans lived on a shifting cultivation system and that the alien definition would dispossess them by embracing their land as ‘waste’. Alienation of their land in this manner greatly hurt the people.
The war was ignited in 1898 by an incident which served as the immediate cause of the war. Having failed to get the British home government to pay for the cost of running the protectorate and not wishing to pass the cost on to the Colony budget, the Governor, Frederick Cardew, imposed an annual tax of between five and ten shillings on each household in the protectorate. Those who had no money could pay in kind with palm oil or rice. The people interpreted this to mean that henceforth they no longer owned the houses they themselves had built. How could they be asked to pay a tax as rent on their own houses, levied by an alien authority for the running of a Protectorate they had neither asked for nor needed?
Cardew directed that collection of the tax should start with the three districts bordering on the Colony; this was to be extended to the remaining two districts in the remote hinterland in due course. The tax was imposed not only on the ‘natives’ but also on the Creoles owning houses in the Protectorate; but it was mainly the natives who openly opposed the levy. The harsh method of its collection by some of the Frontier Police added to the objections of the people. The tax was a symbol of their loss of sovereignty. The revolt which ensued in 1898 was a war to preserve their independence.
Course of the war
Dissatisfaction in the hinterland exploded into violence in 1898. But at first the chiefs of the Temne in the North tried peaceful methods of protest. They petitioned the colonial government. A delegation spent some time in Freetown for the purpose. When their protests were unheeded, they had no other way open to them but submission, or violence. The House Tax became the climax and symbol of all their grievances.Armed resistance started first at Port Loko, among the Temne, led by the local ruler Bai Bureh (Kebelai’s official title as chief of Kasseh in the land of Temne).
In February 1898, the British tried to collect House Tax at Port Loko, not far from Bai Bureh’s capital. The people refused, and Bai Bureh was blamed for this. Troops were sent to arrest him, but they could not withstand the local people’s resistance. The other Temne states came to the aid of Bai Bureh, who continued to conduct guerrilla warfare against the British for nearly a year. Reinforcements were sent from Freetown. Eventually the troops defeated Bai Bureh and his men. The resistance broke down when a newly recruited force, the West African Regiment, containing men who were familiar with West African conditions, replaced the original (black) West Indian Regiment.
Eventually Bai Bureh was arrested and exiled to Ghana. He was allowed to return to his native land in 1905 and shortly after that. The situation in the South was much worse. The Mende, Vai, Loko, Bulom and Susu people also took up arms against the collection of the Tax. They attacked all people whom they considered enemies; whites and Creoles. The Mende who aped European culture were also slaughtered. The Creoles’ list of the dead was recorded at 1,000. In Ronietta and Bandjuma Districts there were hardly any rules concerning the method of collecting the tax.
The Frontier Police resorted to vandalism in order to enforce payment. Having planned resistance secretly within the Poro Society, the Mende and others rose against the oppressive measures. Not having a leader of Bai Bureh’s calibre, the Mende were not organized or united. In consequence their resistance was quickly broken. Several hundreds of the leaders were tried and about 96 were hanged.
Consequences of the war
The House Tax War affected the history of what became to be known as the Protectorate in several ways:
(i) Defeat of the natives led to loss of their ancestral independence, but heavy loss of lives, among the natives and among the Creoles who because of their dual position, were mistrusted both by the British officials and the Africans alike. The callous methods of the Frontier Police also resulted in considerable loss of property.
(ii) The British victimised many of the local rulers who led the resistance movement. Many of them were executed. Others were removed from their chieftaincy. They were replaced by leaders loyal to the British. Some of these loyal leaders were elevated to higher positions in society.
(iii) Governor Cardew proceeded with levying the offending tax. The Colonial Office in London sent out a special Commissioner, Sir David Charmers, to study the causes of the war and also to advise whether or not the House Tax should be stopped. He stated in his report that the cause of the war was the Tax, and recommended that it should be abolished. Governor Cardew prepared a counter-report and insisted that the tax must continue, first because without the tax there would be no money to run and develop the Protectorate, as both the home government and the Colony government were unprepared to shoulder the cost of running the Protectorate, and second, if the tax were abolished, it would harm the prestige of the British as the people might think such an action to be victory. After the war Governor Cardew marched the West African Regiment through the countryside to give a demonstration of British strength.
(iv) The influence of the Creoles declined, for the British blamed them for many of the troubles. Hitherto they had been placed in various positions of responsibility in the colonial administration. From 1898, the colonial authorities mistrusted them and not only removed many of them from high positions but stopped the further appointments of Creoles. The new emphasis was in employing mainly British Officials in the interior.
(v) The development of the Protectorate separate from the Colony meant that two sets of people were living under the same colonial power based in Freetown. Laws meant for the Protectorate were made from the Colony. Not unnaturally the Creoles in the Colony began for different, but additional reasons, to feel superior to the people in the ‘provinces’, a situation which only changed after Sierra Leone achieved independence.
Mwanga’s Revolt, 1897
The previous three years had seen Mwanga try to be submissive to British rule. He felt that during this time he had suffered unbearable political frustration in the new British administrative system, which had left him only with a title – real authority being held by the two Christian Katikiros, Chief Justice and Treasurer. He could bear this no more and decided to act.
On 6th July 1897, he escaped from his capital to raise a revolt against the young British administration. He fled to Buddu, in southwest Buganda – an area not yet influenced by the British – and got immediate support. Quite surprisingly, in Kampala and other counties, if anybody supported Mwanga, he did not show it very enthusiastically. The two Christian Katikiros studied the situation carefully, and decided to throw in their lot with Britain, a move that was as opportunistic as it was grateful, for unlike the Kabaka and his men who had lost power with the establishment of British control, Christian leaders had all gained power. In Buddu, Mwanga was defeated and fled to German East Africa (Tanganyika).
The Acting Commissioner, Col Trevor Ternan, officially deposed the Kabaka and called leading chiefs to Kampala to proclaim, according to tradition, the accession of Mwanga’s infant son, Daudi Chwa. Three regents were appointed to help the new Kabaka: Apolo Kagwa (senior Katikiro), Stanislaus Mugwanya (senior Catholic chief), and Zachary Kisingiri (senior Protestant Chief).
The senior regent, Apolo Kagwa, created for himself such a position of authority by his co-operation with the Protectorate Administration, coupled with the strength of his character, that Buganda never became united under its Kabaka until after Kagwa’s death. Mwanga, meanwhile, escaped from his exile early in 1898 and sought refuge with his former enemy, Kabalega, north of the Nile among the Lango.
The two former rulers were betrayed and captured in April 1899 and in due course deported to Kismayu and then to Seychelles. In exile, Kabalega, whose opposition to the foreigners had been mostly persistent, became a Christian. He was baptised John and was allowed to return to Uganda. He died in Jinja in1923 before he could reach Bunyoro. Mwanga died in exile in the Seychelles.
Revolt by the Sudanese troops, 1897
The revolt by the Sudanese troops was the next disturbance of the late 1890s. This was not necessarily resistance against the establishment of British rule – as Kabalega’s and Mwanga’s had been – but a reaction by the troops to the treatment they got from the British. Those involved were those who had participated in the campaign against Mwanga.
Almost immediately after this campaign the troops had been ordered to march to Eldama Ravine to be led by Major Macdonald for the purpose of countering the rumoured advance by the French towards the Upper Nile. The Sudanese troops reached Eldama Ravine but once there refused to proceed farther. They mutinied for four main reasons. Firstly, their salary was in arrears. This had been occasioned by the difficulty in obtaining adequate supplies of cloth, which formed normal currency in East Africa. Secondly, they had not been allowed to bring with them the women who normally accompanied them to minister to their comfort on long marches. Thirdly, they were not willing to come under the command of Major Macdonald. They knew he despised them and had mistreated their former leader Selim Bey.
Finally, they felt unnecessarily and inhumanly overworked. They had fought a year-long war in the campaign against Kabalega in Bunyoro. They had then been sent east against the Tugen and the Nandi of the Rift Valley. Soon afterwards they were brought back to suppress Mwanga’s revolt. Then they were ordered east again to Eldama Ravine in the Rift Valley to escort Major Macdonald, whom they hated, to some unknown place.
They were tired.Having unsuccessfully stated their case, the troops retreated to Lubwa’s in Busoga where they were welcomed by the Sudanese garrison who had already seized three British officials. The mutineers were hotly pursued by Macdonald and there followed a long siege of Lubwa’s during the early stages of which the three imprisoned officials were killed. The Muslims in Kampala did not take advantage of the fluid state of affairs to stage a revolt, mainly because of the refusal of their leader Mbogo to break his word with Lugard.
The Christian Baganda, on the other hand rallied to the aid of the Protectorate authorities. Under the leadership of Apolo Kagwa, the senior Katikiro, a large force marched to Lubwa’s to take part in the siege. Many lost their lives in the skirmishes which took place outside the stockade.
Early in January 1898 the mutineers made good their escape and after a fierce engagement with pursuing forces, the survivors took refuge north of the Nile where some of them joined Kabalega. They caused no further trouble, but were subsequently followed into the swamps beyond Lake Kyoga in 1901 and dispersed.
Results and significance of the revolts
The rebellion by the Sudanese troops had two important results. First, the loyalty of the Christian Baganda demonstrated clearly the allegiance of the leading chiefs to the new authority of Britain. Second was the reaction in Britain of prolonged military operations in Uganda.
Considerable sums of money had to be sent by Britain to assist in putting down the revolts. the expenditure of this money convinced the British Government that a more decisive policy was necessary in the Protectorate. Consequently, in 1899 Sir Harry Johnston was appointed a Special Commissioner to go to Uganda and to make recommendations on the future administration of the protectorate.
He was especially to investigate how the resources of the Protectorate could be so developed as to relieve the financial burden upon Britain. Johnston’s detailed deliberations with Baganda chiefs resulted in the famous Buganda Agreement of 1900, which formalized the system of indirect rule in the Kingdom.
The Buganda Agreement, 1900
The Buganda Agreement established indirect rule system in Buganda. Similar arrangements were reached with Toro and Ankole, and ‘Buganda Model’ seemed to be the method the British were set to use in ruling Uganda. Buganda Model comprised two aspects: the traditional structure of government in Buganda, and the British claim to be the overruling power above this structure. The Agreement dealt with three main issues:
(i) Administrative structure: The government of the Kingdom of Buganda was vested in the Kabaka and specified Baganda officials or chiefs, subject to the supervision of the British Administration in the Protectorate of Uganda. The Kabaka would continue to rule, but with the help of the British Commissioner and the Lukiko. He was given the title ‘His Highness’ and was to be helped by three ministers: the Katikiro (Prime Minister), the Obulamuzi (Chief Justice) and the Omuwanika (Finance Minister). The Lukiko was now to work as a legislature and as Buganda’s court of appeal. For the first time its membership was fixed at 3 ministers, 20 saza chiefs, 60 notables and 6 additional persons appointed by the Kabaka. Buganda itself would now be a province of the Protectorate.
(ii) Taxation: There was to be a hut-tax of 3 rupees per year. This was to be collected by the Baganda chiefs and ministers, who would be paid for their services. Taxes collected in the kingdom were to be remitted to the Protectorate government. In return, no further taxation would be levied without the Kabaka’s permission.
(iii) Land settlement: Half the land in Buganda was made Crown Land, in other words, property of the British government. The remainder of the land was to be divided by the Lukiko into square miles (mailos) and given to the Kabaka and his family, ministers and chiefs. They were all given freehold titles of land, meaning they would own the land forever – a departure from the past practices where land was held at the pleasure of the Kabaka, never permanently.
The Maji Maji War, 1905-7
The Germans had been in Tanzania since the previous century when Maji Maji broke out against them.
Causes of Maji Maji
Maji Maji was caused by the following three main factors:
(i) The cotton programme
The principal cause of Maji Maji war was cotton. For centuries before 1905, Tanganyika’s centre of gravity had lain in the south, first in the wealth of Kilwa, then much later in the new military states of the Sangu and the Hehe. Largely, the German government had first directed its programme to the highland settlement areas of the north, but by 1900, this programme seemed to have failed. Desperately in need of revenue, the government turned to a policy of African cash crop agriculture, and for this they naturally looked to the south. In 1902, Governor Adolf von Gotzen announced the adoption of a programme – borrowed from Togo in West Africa – of compulsory cotton cultivation. This was not by individual African farmers but on communal neighbourhood fields, one at the headquarters of each recognized headman (jumbe). He ordered that every jumbe and akida establish a cotton plot where all his people would come to work. The arrangement was that when cotton was finally sold, the workers, the akida and the government would share the profits equally.
The programme failed. It was marred by the hardship faced by those involved. Workers in the plantations were a compelled, rather than a willing and voluntary force. Labour was controlled with brutal force and there was little motivation. The soil was unsuitable so it produced poor crops. The marketing system broke down. Subordinate officials pocketed the little cash earned before it reached the producers. Few if any peasants received any payments at all in the first two years. The Zaramo workers refused the 35 cents they were each offered at the end of the first year’s work. The whole scheme created very strong incentives for a revolt among the Wamatumbi, Zaramo and other peasants in the south. Essentially, then, Maji Maji was a revolt against the government which was interfering incompetently with the way in which farmers grew their crops and managed their land.
(ii) The Advent of Arab Akidas
Forced cultivation of unprofitable cash crops was a widespread grievance in southern Tanzania, but it was not the only one. There were peculiarities in certain areas. The Wamatumbi, for example, hated the Arab Akidas and the askaris whom the Germans set over them. Up to now the Wamatumbi had successfully rejected Arab influence by barring them from entering Matumbi. Under German colonial administration, Arabs were employed as akidas and assigned, especially at the coast to administer. Thus in Matumbi there were Arab akidas at Kibata, Chumo, Miteja, Kinjumbi and Samanga.
The tragedy of this arrangement was that the Arabs had now been given an opportunity to rule a people who for years had frustrated their commercial and political efforts. There was much abuse of power as vengeance reigned high. People were seized and reduced to slaves. Backed by the askaris the Arab akidas’ conduct in Matumbi could not go on forever. The brutality with which the akida were handled when the explosion against the German administration finally occurred was a reflection of their own conduct towards the people
(iii) Outrageous conduct of German officials
The German officials handled their African subjects with extreme brutality. On the slightest excuse the new rulers resorted to public flogging, or even killing of their subjects. They imposed a house (hut) tax, which was collected with excessive force. Apart from the common grievances which they shared with the other tribes, Wangindos’ major complaint concerned the habit of German officials and especially that of their mercenaries and househelps, sleeping with their wives in circumstances which were a flagrant affront to Ngindo husbands. Their behaviour was punishable by war against the offender. The Wangindo were left with no alternative but to fight the Germans.
Organisation and course of the war
The Germans had defeated every tribe that had resisted their invasion during the l9th century. The tribes were small and divided. Besides, they had no weapons to match the rifles of the German troops. Now in the 20th Century, the people knew what they wanted to do, but waited and suffered, conscious of their disunity and the military strength of their rulers. Then, in the year 1904, a prophet arose. His name was Kinjikitile Ngwale.
Near his home at Ngarambe there was a pool in a tributary of the River Rufiji. Kinjikitile claimed that the spirit, Hongo, who dwelt in the pool had possessed him.Kinjikitile taught that Africans were one and that his medicine - the maji of the rising’s name - was stronger than European weapons. His teaching spread among the people living around the River Rufiji. It reached the Matumbi through a whispering campaign they called Njwiywila (or ‘Jujila’). Njwiywila was a secret communication from one person to another that at a place called Ngarambe, a powerful medicineman who could make white men more vulnerable had emerged. It was further added that ancestors had not died but were looked after by God. They would be shown to those who went to Ngarambe.Pilgrimages to Ngarambe followed quickly upon the phase of Njwiywila in early 1905.
At Ngarambe, Kinjikitile, who had assumed the title Bokero (intermediary between men and the spirit), gave them the medicine against German weapons and committed them to war. The medicine consisted of a mixture of millet flour in water, and was smeared or sprinkled on the forehead of the prospective fighter. Sometimes he only drank the water. From the beginning, Kinjikitile Ngwale’s message promised aid against European rule. As the people flocked to Ngarambe, so the militancy of the movement grew. Finally, sometime during 1905, Kinjikitile sent representatives through the surrounding country to mobilise and train the people for war. He promised them protection against European weapons. He offered them leadership, organization, and unity.
But he required that all the pilgrims, get the medicine, go back, and continue to work for the Germans and wait until he gave appropriate orders to start fighting. By July 1905 no order had come, and the Wamatumbi became impatient and began to look for ways of provoking the Germans.They decided to uproot a few cotton shoots from the Jumbe’s plantation. The Jumbe reported the incident to the Akida at Kibata. Messengers sent by the Akida to investigate were rudely turned back and pursued. Before they arrived back the Wamatumbi forced them into the first engagement at Matumbi Hills on 31July 1905. The Maji Maji wars had begun. On that night the revolt claimed its first five victims. One was a German planter named Hopfer.
He was 28 years old, and he was killed with an axe, somewhere in the bush near Mtumbei Chini, forty miles west of Kilwa. The others were the four men of the Matumbi people whom Hopfer is said to have shot as they closed in on him.The news spread rapidly among the people of the Rufiji Valley who had already heard Kinjikitile’s message. This was harvesting time, but the Pogoro of Kitope refused to pick cotton. They burnt cotton in the fields in many areas of southern Tanzania.
The town of Samanga was looted and burnt to the ground. Akidas, Jumbes and those who worked for the Europeans were attacked viciously. Early in August the people of Kichi, southern Uzaramo, western Uluguru, and Ungindo joined the war. The Germans were completely taken by surprise and were ill-prepared for this mass explosion. The Governor ordered reinforcements from Germany and other parts of German Africa. By November 1905, a systematic and ruthless suppression of the movement had begun. Some African communities joined the Germans against their fellow Africans, considerably boosting German military strength.
The Hehe were an example; they supported the Germans because their traditional enemies, the Pogoro, Mbunga, Sagara and Ngoni were fighting against the Germans. In 1905, Kiwanga, the chief of Mahenge joined the German side in gratitude for their help against Mkwawa in the 1890s. Maji Maji leaders were executed, or escaped into Mozambique. Towards the end of 1906, and by the beginning of 1907, the movement was dead.
Reasons for failure of Maji Maji
Maji Maji failed for four main reasons:
• The German troops were better trained and better equipped. African fighters were armed with a religious belief in their invincibility to German rifles and cannons, and with the traditional African weapons at the time – spears, shields and clubs. The Germans overcame both types of weapons rapidly.
• It was through the maji ideology that the leaders of the Maji Maji were able to be united and to secure the highest degree of mass commitment from a vastly diversified people spread out over a vast region. But as violence and insecurity caused by German counter-offensive tested the loyalties of the participants, the ancient ties of kinship proved stronger than the maji ideology. The peasant revolt disintegrated into a tribal and a clan guerrilla war.
• Maji Maji lacked a unified command, and clear and united fighting plans. True, it produced many able guerrilla commanders: Abdalla Mapanda in Nachingwea; Selemani Mamba in Mwera; Digalu Kabasila in Maheromangu; and Chebruma Hanga in Songea. Yet none of these emerged as a genuinely charismatic revolutionary leader able to appeal beyond his people. The Germans therefore took full advantage of this leadership gap and defeated them one by one.
• The harshness and cruelty of the Germans was excessive. They were merciless and destroyed crops and homes, so that people starved and had nowhere to live. Thus weakened, the people were unable to sustain their revolt.
Consequences of Maji Maji
Maji Maji had a number of short-time consequences:
(i.) Destruction and devastation. The immediate consequences of the rising were tragic. The German forces left behind a trail of destruction and devastation that led to three years of the most terrible famine. This was the period known as Fugafuga, when survivors took to eating insects and wild fruit. Villages had been destroyed and families broken up. It has been estimated that 75,000 Africans died as a result of the fighting and the famine.
(ii.) Inadequacies of religious organisation. Maji Maji taught the Africans that the religious unity that had enabled them to fight together was not enough. Their weapons were weak compared to those of the Germans, and they needed better organisation. The Africans realized that armed resistance was no use; instead better methods had to be found. In addition to organisation, they were to learn the importance of leadership in any campaign against oppressive foreign rule.
(iii.) Reforms of GovernorCount Freiherr von Rechenberg. The German government had also learnt a lesson. They had defeated the Africans but it had not been easy. They realised the need for better rule in their colony. They had to take their colony more seriously, and treat the Africans better. The German government appointed a new and more understanding governor. His name was Count Freiherr von Rechenberg (1906 – 12). Rechenberg was an extremely able administrator who knew the colony well, since he had served there as a judge (1893) and had also been German Consul in Zanzibar (1896 – 1900). He had mastered the Swahili language. He believed that the interests of the native inhabitants should not be subordinated to those of the white settlers. He strongly opposed the indiscriminate use of the whip and insisted that corporal punishment should be inflicted only by due process of law.
Thus the period after Maji Maji was a peaceful era of reform and development. As a result, the Africans became firm allies of the Germans and they cooperated with them during the First World War in 1914. This surprised the British who had thought that the people of Tanganyika loathed the Germans. There were too, long-term consequences of Maji Maji. The revolt has come to be regarded as the national epic of the people of Tanzania. When Germany lost the War in 1918, the Germans were expelled from East Africa. The newly founded League of Nations took over the territories of the defeated nation. Tanganyika was mandated to Britain. Similarly Rwanda and Burundi were ‘given’ to Belgium.
Activity 5.3
In groups of ten, use the available resources such as the Internet and books in the library to find out the reforms that were introduced by Governor Count Freiherr von Rechenberg in Tanganyika after the Maji Maji Rebellion.
How were the reforms helpful to the native people?
The Shona-Ndebele (Chimurenga) War, 1896 –1897
The Shona-Ndebele war, otherwise known as the Chimurenga, broke out in March 1896 between the Ndebele and the British. The Shona joined the Ndebele in the war in June of the same year
Causes of the Shona-Ndebele War
The Chimurenga war was caused by a number of factors:
(i) Loss of independence: The Ndebele were displeased by the British taking over political control over Matabeleland and denying their traditional leaders power to control the region. They wanted to regain their independence.
(ii) Loss of land: It had always been the chiefs’ right to allocate land in Mashonaland. Native land was alienated by the white settlers, the BSA Company or by mission stations, without the chiefs’ permission. The whites claimed that Lobengula had granted land in Mashonaland, and that the Company therefore had the right to allocate it. But the Shona chiefs did not regard themselves as subjects of Lobengula. One of the most cherished chiefly rights was the right to allocate land. This right was now threatened. Meanwhile, the BSA Company took away all the good land and created poor reserves for the Ndebele people.
(iii) Loss of cattle: The issue of cattle also caused considerable distress to the Ndebele. There had been some 250,000 heads of cattle in Ndebele hands before the 1893 war. The ndembele cattlewere shared among the Volunteers, police, taken as BSA Company property while others were rustled into South Africa by white adventurers. The Ndebele were allowed to keep only 40,930 heads of cattle, and most of these were given to senior indunas and not to the younger men, which showed a total disregard of Ndebele customs. This increased Ndebele resentment.
(iv) Unpopular veterinary policies: The loss of cattle after the rinderpest outbreak in 1895 led to a decision by the BSA Company to shoot and burn animals to prevent the spread of disease. This decision annoyed the Ndebele.
(v) Interference with Shona trade: The Shona were unhappy with the British interference with their trade in gold-dust and ivory with the Portuguese in return for cheap goods at the coast. The trade was valuable because it provided guns, and it gave the chief the means of wealth and hospitality. Now, however, the Company sought to replace the Portuguese as Shona’s trading partners but was interested only in European gold mining, not in buying gold from the Africans, and tried to stop the sale of gold-dust by African merchants from the Zambezi. The Shona were only allowed to buy goods from South Africa, which were more expensive than the Portuguese articles.
(vi) Shona suspicion with intentions of the whites: The Shona increasingly grew suspicious of the true intentions of BSA Company men. When the whites first came the chiefs thought they would stay as their subjects, and that their stay was temporary. Each chief was seeking for temporary white allies to balance the allies his rival might manage to recruit. But gradually people began to realize that the whites intended to stay – and they intended to make the chiefs their subjects instead of allies.
(vii) Forced labour: The Native Commissioner in each district was given the power to force chiefs to provide labour for mines and farms. Working conditions were deplorable. The system was no better than slavery. All able-bodied men had to work, whether they were Ndebele aristocrats or their former slaves. This naturally caused dissatisfaction among the zansi or Ndebele aristocrats. Employers and Native Commissioners used the sjambok (a kind of whip). Punishments were often threatened just before payday, so that workers would run away before they had received their wages.
(viii) Hut-tax: The Company administration introduced and demanded a hut-tax among the Shona in 1894. The meaning of this demand to the Shona was that they were being asked to submit to the whites when they had neither been conquered nor disarmed. The demand for tax was resented because it was regarded as the greatest threat yet to the political independence of the chiefs; its collection usually took the form of brutal raids and seizure of the Shona cattle and sheep instead of money, which the Shona did not have; and it was introduced abruptly, Jameson leaving its collection to Native Commissioners who were young, inexperienced and often dishonest. The Shona resentment blossomed into Chimurenga.
(ix) Law and punishment: The whites began to assume the right to punish the subjects of the Shona chiefs, thus usurping the chiefs’ powers. They did this brutally, frequently using the sjambok. Lendy of the Victoria Incident fame killed Chief Ngomo and twenty-two others after goods had been stolen from a farmer called Bennett. Lendy was promoted and Jameson applauded his action. The Shona began to adopt a hostile attitude to the whites.
(x) Humiliation and social suffering by the Ndebele: The Ndebele suffered socially. The military towns were broken up and the age regiment system abolished. Indunas lost their power. Not only were the whites themselves arrogant to the Ndebele, but by appointing Shona police to work in Ndebele areas, they gave the Shona a chance to get their own back on the Ndebele after several decades of suppression. The Ndebele could not take it anymore.
(xi) The role of the native police among the Shona: The Chiefs found their authority challenged by the new Native Police. These police were either recruited outside the district or from among servants or semi-slaves of the chiefs, the so-called Vanyai. They had been quick to switch over to Europeans either for refuge or because they wanted European goods and were among the first to join the native police force, welcoming an opportunity for revenge on their former masters. The police were a greedy lot and thought they had a right to everything they came across. In the eyes of the Shona, the conduct of the Europeans, whose direct agents and reflection the police were, could not be distinguished from that of the hated Ndebele.
(xii) Natural disasters: Natural disasters like famine, drought, locust invasion and diseases like rinderpest and smallpox were given religious interpretation. They believed that the god, Mwari of both the Shona and Ndebele was unhappy with British occupation. Indeed, the Mwari cult ultimately played a crucial role in Chimurenga.
(xiii) Disregard for the Ndebele customs: The British disregarded Ndebele customs. Especially irksome was their attitude towards the Ndebele class system, which they ignored. They treated everybody equally including the Holi caste who were traditionally slaves to the Ndebele.
(xiv) Opportunity in the Jameson Raid of 1896: The Jameson Raid on the Transvaal provided a unique opportunity for the Chimurenga. In January 1896, Dr. Jameson led a party of Mashonaland Police to the Transvaal. His aim was to overthrow the Transvaal government under Paul Kruger for Cecil Rhodes. However, the Jameson Raid was a complete debacle for the British and quite instructive to the Ndebele. It taught the Ndebele the valuable lesson that the British, after all, were not invincible. Jameson was recalled back to Britain as a result, and with him and his police out of the country, the Ndebele had the chance they had been waiting for.
Results of the Shona-Ndebele War
The Ndebele and Shona had fought against a common enemy in unexpected unity that adherence to the Mwari cult had partly been responsible for. The results of the Chimurenga war include the following:
(i)Split in Ndebele unity. In Matabeleland the leaders of the older group decided to treat for peace while the younger generation was determined to continue fighting. This disagreement brought the unity of the fighters to an end.
(ii)High cost of war and Rhodes’ quest for peace with the Ndebele. Over 130 Europeans and Africans were killed. Rhodes had been told by General Carrington that to win his war, he would have to build a railway to Bulawayo and bring up 6,000 troops from South Africa. This would cost the Company £5 million. Rhodes was also faced with the prospect of losing the Company’s charter if war continued. He wanted peace, and personally went to the hills to negotiate with Ndebele leaders. He waited for six weeks in the foothills of the Matopos before the indunas would agree to meet him. Rhodes listened to their grievances. The indunas said they wanted the Shona police to be disbanded and the Ndebele headmen to be given some power.
(iii)Rhodes’ promises. Rhodes promised the Ndebele that the administration would be reformed and the Ndebele would be allowed to come out of the hills and settle down in their pre-1893 land. Some of the resistance leaders would be given official posts and paid a salary as recognized indunas. There would be no victimization of the Ndebele or of their leaders. No Shona police would be used in Matabeleland without the authority of the Ndebele.
(vi)Results for the Ndebele. Many of these promises were actually kept and the terms were some kind of victory for the Ndebele. Indeed, some of the most respected leaders of the rising did become recognized indunas and were paid salaries for their services; they were therefore able to give their people some leadership within the new system. This is how Umlugulu, the Ndebele leader in the war, became an induna of the Gwanda district. Indeed, some Ndebele were posted to help in administrative duties in Mashonaland. But the Mwari and Mhondoro priests were punished for their part in the rising: Siginyamatshe for instance was sentenced to twelve years hard labour. But Mkwati who had been the backbone of the spiritual unity of the Ndebele, escaped, and with his help, the war spread to Mashonaland. He was largely responsible for the refusal of the Shona to treat for peace.
(v)Results for the Shona.When the Ndebele treated for peace, the Shona continued the war. They were hunted down and killed throughout 1897. After the capture of their religious leaders, chiefs Kakubi and Nehanda, most of them surrendered unconditionally. Their chiefs were given no terms and no promises. Many of them were put on trial for murder and hanged. The result was that Shona chiefs no longer appeared as leaders of their people in the old sense; the indunas lost their positions, land and authority, in contrast to Ndebele chiefs some of whose positions were recognised. Most of the Shona retired in acceptance of complete defeat.
(vi) British government indictment of BSA Company. All in all, the events of 1897 had been very damaging to the image of the new administration. The BSA Company was discredited abroad, both for its Jameson Raid debacle in the Transvaal and its Rhodesian conduct. The Rhodesian white population was blamed for its various acts of oppression and regarded as a dangerous and irresponsible community.
(vii)Erosion of traditional beliefs. The risings had been a political war to evict the white man. But the Mwari or Mlimo Cult had played a leading religious role in strengthening the fighters. The defeat of the risings was therefore, a serious blow to the people’s confidence in the tribal spirits in the face of modern weaponry and organization. Some even became Christian in protest. Here in the risings then, was the beginning of the slow process of erosion of traditional beliefs and customs.
(viii)Confiscation of cattle. The Company confiscated a lot of cattle from the Shona and Ndebele as compensation for losses incurred during the war. These were given to white volunteers who had participated in the war.
(ix)Advent of famine. Africans were exposed to severe famine because the war discouraged agricultural activities. The Ndebele were given one million bags of maize as relief food from South Africa.
(x) Improvement in tax policy. There was improvement in the tax policies for the Africans; a tax reduction on the Shona and Ndebele from £2 to £1 was introduced.
(xi) Division of the country. The country was divided up into districts and the Ndebele and the Shona were settled in different areas so that they could not unite again against the British.
Collaboration
Activity 5.4
In groups of three. Using the Internet,textbooks and other sources of historical information;
1. Explain collaboration in relation to colonisation using relevant examples.
2. Find out the forms of collaborations.
3. Give the reasons for collaboration.
4. Find out the consequences of collaboration.
5. Compile an essay on the various aspects of collaboration.
6. Discuss your findings in a class presentation
Types of collaboration
The use of violent methods might have been prevalent, but in some areas, African cooperation was obtained by dangling various attractions before them. However, that even in such areas, Africans hoped that cooperation would ensure, rather than diminish their independence. Below are examples of the various ways African communities collaborated with the European colonialists.
The Wanga collaboration
Mumia, the Nabongo (King) of Wanga had developed a liking for foreigners from an early date. Arab and Swahili caravans in search of ivory and slaves had found hospitality with Mumia. His country lay in the main coast-Uganda route. When the IBEA Company discovered Mumia’s unending friendliness, they built a station at Lureko (Mumias).
On British Government takeover in 1895, the station became the headquarters for Western Kenya, until 1920 when it was transferred to Kakamega. Mumia collaborated for four main reasons. Firstly, he wanted the British to help him against his enemies; the Luo of Ugenya and the Bukusu. Secondly, he realized the futility of resisting the British especially after learning of the defeat of the Bukusu and Nandi. Mumia had also heard of Baganda having fallen to the British. He also realized his community was small and ill-equipped to face the British.
Thirdly, he wanted to expand his territory and the military support of the British would come in handy. Finally, collaboration was not new to Mumia. He had initially welcomed Swahili and Arabs and was thus on very friendly grounds as this was an old habit.
For their part, the British found friendship with Mumia sensible. From Nabongo’s capital at Mumias, expeditions were sent against the neighbouring communities between about 1894 and 1906. The expeditions were largely composed of Baganda and Sudanese soldiers in the service of the British administration in Uganda.
Throughout, however, Mumia’s fighters joined them. By 1906, military expeditions had been successfully completed against the Nandi, Nyang’ori, Sotik, Luo (Ugenya, Sakwa and Seme) and the northern Luyia (Bukusu and Banyala).
Results of Wanga collaboration
Collaboration worked well for both the Wanga and the British in various ways as follows:
• In recognition of his services and loyalty, Mumia was made a Paramount Chief in 1909. His position was thus strengthened as he was consulted over appointment of headmen and chiefs in the region of western Kenya up to 1920. Indeed, his brothers and relatives were sent as chiefs and headmen to many areas throughout Western Kenya. For instance, his step brother Murunga was appointed chief of Isukha and Idakho. These appointments were resented by the communities over which the chiefs ruled.
• Elureko became administrative headquarters of the British in western region.
• Mumias became a major trading centre; it was a resting point for traders en route to Uganda. This position was only taken over by Kisumu after 1901.
• Mumia and his subjects got material wealth like clothes, fire arms and bicycles, for the Wanga co-operation. Mumia’s step brother, Murunga, became the first Wanga to own a bicycle.
The Maasai collaboration
The Maasai are a Nilotic speaking community. They occupied an area stretching from the Uasin Gishu plateau in the north to the plains around Mount Meru in Tanzania to the south. From AD 1750, they were the dominant group in the Rift Valley. Organised and strong militarily, the Maasai were a constant threat to their neighbours whom they raided for cattle at will. The caravan traders avoided Maasai country for they spared no strangers on their land. When in the late 19thCentury the British appeared on the scene, it was expected that the Maasai would put up a stiff resistance against them. But they did not, and instead became one of the best examples of Kenyan
Reasons for collaboration
This response can be explained by five main factors:
(i) Effects of the rise of the Nandi. The rise of the Nandi from the 1850s adversely affected Maasai power. They began raiding the same communities for cattle which were traditionally Maasai raiding grounds. The Nandi even successfully raided the Uasin Gishu Maasai. Second, at the time of the British penetration of Kenya the Maasai were economically and politically in a state of decline. The civil wars of the 19th Century had destroyed whole sections of the Maasai including the Uasin Gishu, the Ngurumaini, the Iloogolala and the Losegallai. From 1889 to 1890, cattle diseases spread to Maasailand, especially rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia.
(ii) Drought of 1891. In 1891 there was drought and famine with smallpox and cholera, further reducing both human and animal populations. As a result of these calamities, many Maasai joined up with Kikuyu and Akamba neighbours. Others sold their women and children to neighbouring peoples. Still others became mercenaries, especially in the armies of Mumia and Akamba. The Maasai were no longer as strong as they used to be.
(iii) Succession disputes. In 1890, Mbatiany, the great Laibon of the Purko and Rift Valley Maasai, died. Although a laibon by tradition was only a ritual expert and prophet, Mbatiany had also gained political power in the civil wars. Thus the position of laibon was still politically attractive when Mbatiany died, but there was no one of his stature to succeed him, and his two sons, Lenana and Sendeyo both claimed and disputed the position of laibon for ten years. Sendeyo was finally driven with his followers to the Loita region of northern Tanzania. But he never gave up and continued raids against the territory of his brother Lenana who remained in the area between Ngong and Naivasha.
(vi) Dispute with the Kikuyu. Succession dispute placed the Maasai in an even weaker position in the face of the incoming British. Lenana was also in dispute with the Kikuyu. Following the calamities that befell the Maasai as already outlined, Lenana had arranged for some Maasai women and children to be cared for in Kikuyu villages to avoid certain death. When he later went back for them he learnt that the Kikuyu had sold many of them to the slave traders. He quarrelled with the Kikuyu and prepared to go to war against them. He grew desperate: his enemies threatened to destroy him and his people; he was faced by the problems of raids by Sendeyo; there were frictions with the Kikuyu; famine and disease were afflicting his people and cattle. Lenana sought the support of the IBEACo agent, Francis Hall at Fort Smith. And Hall was only too happy to oblige, and assisted Lenana in his campaigns agains Sendeyo and the Kikuyu. The British and the Maasai became allies. Maasai warriors assisted the British against other Kenyan peoples from 1894 to 1908.
(v) The Kedong Valley Massacre. There was the Ewuaso-oo-Ng’indongi Massacre (Kedong Valley Massacre) of November 1895, and the friendship between Lenana and the British was sealed. A caravan of the Kikuyu, Swahili and Arab porters was returning from Eldama Ravine. Resting in the Ng’indongi Valley near Naivasha, members of the caravan attacked the Maasai, stole food and seized some Maasai girls. The Moran attacked the caravan, killing 647 out of 871 men. On getting the news, a Scottish trader, Andrew Dick, who was camped nearby, took the caravan side and set forth with two French travellers to fight the Maasai. He shot dead about 100 Maasai before he himself was killed. But this incident, in which three white men had killed a hundred Maasai warriors in one encounter, so shocked the Maasai that they immediately sought peace. Subsequent investigation into the whole incident by British officials exonerated the Maasai and put the blame for the Massacre upon the porters. Lenana and his people were greatly impressed both by the military might of the white men and the magnanimity and sincerity of the British officials. From these and earlier contacts, good relations between the Maasai and the British were established, and Lenana and his followers collaborated with the British.
Consequences of collaboration
The Maasai collaboration had a number of consequences:
(i) The British helped the Maasai against the Kikuyu and against his rival brother Sendeyo, and later the Maasai morans helped the British in their punitive raids against the Nandi in 1905 and other ‘unco-operative’ communities.
(ii) The British were able to build their railway across Maasailand without any trouble.
(iii) Lenana increased his prestige because the British rewarded him with cattle and he not only successfully claimed the laiboniship but was given the grand title ‘Paramount Chief of the Maasai’ in recognition of his support for the British. This was a purely political position, which helped to alienate him from many Maasai. He then moved permanently away from his traditional home among the Loita to Ngong, to live among the Kaputiei and Keekonyokie.
(iv) However, this happy relationship did not exist for long. Not all British administrators were friends of the Maasai and British Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate from 1901-04, Sir Charles Eliot openly despised the Maasai, asserting that they should abandon their ‘socially and politically abominable’ nomadic habits and settle down. Eliot considered that the Maasai had served their purpose and could no longer pose a threat to the railway or to the administration.
(v) The Anglo-Maasai Agreements, 1904 and 1911: Eliot was succeeded in 1904 by Sir Donald Stewart, who in the same year accomplished what Eliot had been working on earlier - the signing of the first Anglo-Maasai Agreement. While Donald Stewart represented the British, the Maasai were represented by Lenana and his associates such as Masikonte (‘Chief’ of Laikipia) and Ole Gilisho (‘Chief’ of Naivasha). But the mass of the Maasai had no say in the matter. The Maasai are said to have agreed to move to two reserves – to the south of Ngong and to the Laikipia plateau. They were promised that the two areas would remain theirs ‘so long as the Maasai as a race shall exist’. A half-mile corridor would be created to link the two reserves.
But none of these points was implemented. On the other hand, all the land formerly owned by the Maasai was made available for white settlement. As a matter of fact, the Colonial Government and local settlers in particular were determined to alienate the enviable Maasai land.
By 1911, the settlers were putting pressure on the Government to move the Maasai out of Laikipia so that they could move there themselves. The Laikipia Maasai, through their chief, Legalishu, refused to move. Lenana, on the other hand, is said to have agreed as the ‘Paramount Chief’. The second Maasai Agreement of April 1911 settled the matter. This time, the Maasai were literally forced to vacate their lands at great personal inconvenience and loss of property. In fact their lands in Laikipia were appropriated before adequate arrangements were made for them in the less attractive southern reserve (Ngong) even before the Imperial Government in London had given its approval. It is doubtful whether the Maasai agreed to move from Laikipia.
By April 1913, they had vacated Laikipia and moved to the enlarged, but drier and less attractive southern reserve in Ngong. The Maasai ‘as a race’ still existed; but they had virtually been forced to vacate Laikipia for white settlers and, as for other communities, their collaboration had not spared them from the ravenous intents of colonialism.
Sir Apolo Kagwa and Baganda collaboration
In Uganda, perhaps the best example of African collaboration in the early days of colonial rule is served during the reign of Apolo Kagwa. Born in 1869, Apolo Kagwa served as a page in the courts of Kabaka Mutesa and Kabaka Mwanga. He thus learnt the art of political survival in those dangerous times. Converting to Protestantism as a page, he became the leader of the Protestant group that eventually played a part in Mwanga’s downfall. He came out openly and unabashedly in support of the British in their campaign against Mwanga and Kabalega in 1897-9.
This episode was followed by Mwanga’s exile to the Seychelles and in his place his one-year old infant son Daudi Chwa was proclaimed Kabaka. Of the three regents appointed to rule for him during his youth Apolo Kagwa, as Katikiro, was the senior.He therefore played a leading part in the formulation of the Buganda Agreement of 1900, receiving the largest single grant of land outside the royal family. He was granted 78 sq. km (30 sq. miles). He continued to work closely with the British authorities, encouraging the establishment of schools and the adoption of new agricultural methods and crops.
His influence was particularly valuable when Sir Hesketh Bell decided on the evacuation of all people living on the shores of Lake Victoria, in order to eliminate sleeping sickness. He was not afraid to stand up for the rights of traditional Buganda institutions such as the Lukiko. This brought him increasingly into conflict with the protectorate government whenever he felt that the independence of his group, the ‘Bakungu’ chiefs, was being threatened. He had other rivals and enemies within Buganda, including the Bataka and the new generation of chiefs. Moreover, the Kabaka had grown up and was anxious to assert himself. Finally in 1925 Kagwa resigned, angry and disappointed, and died the following year.
On the whole the British did not meet with a great deal of armed resistance after 1900. It took some time, however, to establish regular administration in the north and northeast. A series of boundary agreements made clear the exact extent of the protectorate for the first time. Between 1907 and 1912 the Uganda-Congo border was made clear and in 1914 the West Nile district was added to Uganda from the Sudan. In 1902 the whole of the Eastern province of Uganda was transferred to the East African Protectorate.
Lewanika’s collaboration in (Barotseland) Zambia
The Lozi are among the three main southern Zambian tribes, which include the Tonga and the Ila. They belonged to Bulozi kingdom, and lived as mixed farmers on the fertile flood plain of the region. They had a long tradition of iron-working. They also traded with the Portuguese from the Atlantic coast and the Swahili from the east coast.David Livingstone’s reports on the atrocities of the slave trade gave rise to a flurry of activity in Zambia, aimed at its eradication. This partly explains the establishment of most mission stations in the slave-infested areas of Bemba and Lungu. In Bulozi, the missionaries established an early rapport with the Lozi King, Lewanika, who, ascending the throne in 1884, soon permitted them to begin work in his territory.
Reasons for collaboration
Lewanika’s early collaboration with the missionaries can be explained by a number of factors. First was the desire for his people to get a new type of education, which only the missionaries could give. Second, his kingdom found itself faced with threats of invasion from all directions.
The British advanced from the south and east; the Germans threatened from the south-west; while the Portuguese threatened from both their bases in Angola and Mozambique; nearer home, the Ndebele were a constant menace. Lewanika could not face them all and defend himself. He became a typical candidate for collaboration as a means of self-preservation. He chose the British as his protectors against the rest. Lewanika was eager to seek British protection first against Ndebele attacks.
The Lozi King had several times suffered from Ndebele raids and had observed that the Mangwato, his neighbours, had secured considerable immunity to such attacks by placing themselves under British protection. Khama, the Ngwato ruler, had succeeded in convincing him of the reliability of British protection. Lewanika made a formal application through the pro-British Coillard, who, like Khama, saw every good in Lewanika inviting, welcoming and accepting the protection of the British South Africa Company. Coillard was the only foreigner in whom Lewanika had confidence. He himself feared Portuguese or German interference from the west and desired British protection in order to further his missionary work. Coillard therefore played a significant role in inducing Lewanika to accept the Company.
Coillard wrote to Sheppard, the British administrator in Bechuanaland (Botswana) saying ‘Lewanika is most anxious to solicit the protectorate of the British Government’. The British South African Company, through this request, was later to gain a stake in Lozi Kingdom.
Results of collaboration
Lewanika’s collaboration had a number of results:
(i)BSA’s rights over mining. The BSA Company first gained a foothold in Bulozi when it purchased the concession that Lewanika had sold to Harry Ware. Ware had been granted the right to look for minerals and to carry on mining for a period of twenty years. The permitted area of his operation was through Lewanika’s dominions on the banks of the Manjili River, north and east of the cattle path from the north end of Barotse plain to the Ila country, and west to the Upper Zambezi.
(ii)Lewanika-Lochner Treaty (with BSA Company). In 1890, Frank Lochner, a former officer of the Bechuanaland police, met with Lewanika on behalf of the leader of the BSA Company, Cecil Rhodes. He met the King at Sesheke at a time when the area had become a highly contested one, with several concession seekers rivalling the Company. But the Company was clearly favoured, a fact evidenced by Lewanika’s presentation to Lochner in June 1890 of two large elephant tasks, followed by the signing of a treaty.
(iii) The Lewanika-Coryndon Treaty of 1898 (with the British Government). The treaty allowed the Company to exercise limited authority within Barotseland proper (i.e. the area under effective Lozi control) and throughout the rest of north-western Zambia as far as the Kafue River. It further gave the Company the right to prospect for minerals, trade and mine as before throughout the territory of the Lozi as before. But the center of Bulozi would be closed to prospectors. A new clause granted the Company administrative rights to adjudicate all cases between white men, and between white and black men. Lewanika’s salary, which he had not received between 1890 and 1897 was reduced to £ 850.
The Company, also for the first time, undertook to maintain and endow schools and industrial establishments for the education of the King’s subjects, and the provision of telegraphic, postal and transport facilities. Traditional Lozi rights to game, iron-working and tree-cutting for the manufacture of canoes, were safeguarded. The Company undertook to protect Lewanika and the nation from all outside interference and attack.
Lewanika, on his part, promised to continue trying hard to suppress slavery and witchcraft in his country.The treaty was understood to be a treaty of alliance between the Bulozi nation and the British Government. This treaty was modified a little bit in 1900. But thereafter, Lewanika’s internal authority was greatly reduced and the Company threatened his people with use of force if they rebelled against their collaborating King. Lewanika’s prestige rapidly waned and subordinates in various parts of the kingdom failed to regard him as king or to pay tribute to him. The Company started to give land to the Afrikaners from South Africa. Lewanika persisted in seeking protection from the British Crown, but the Company was in control. He died in 1916 a dejected and disillusioned man.
Collaboration of Khama of the Bamangwato
Khama became chief of the Bamangwato, a small Tswana group, in 1875. His ascent to power was difficult and he became authoritarian and arbitrary. He was an early convert to Christianity. This caused tension between himself and some of his non-Christian followers.
Reasons for collaboration
At the beginning of the Scramble, Khama had to contend with two dangers: Afrikaner expansion and Ndebele conquest. The beginnings of the Scramble in 1884, also brought the British into the area, and it was the British whom Khama and others determined to manipulate. At a meeting in 1885 with the British authorities from the Cape, Khama designed the tactics which were pursued by himself and two other Tswana chiefs, Gaseitsiwe of the Bangwaketse and Sechele of the Bakwena. In requesting British protection they stipulated that they would prefer a continuation of existing laws, particularly those prohibiting the sale of alcohol and the sale of land. However, realizing that the British would almost certainly require land for white settlement, they offered land for that purpose as well.
Significantly, he offered land which was of no value to themselves in any case. Khama offered land which was actually controlled by Lobengula and the Ndebele; Gaseitsiwe offered a vast stretch of the Kalahari Desert; and Sechele offered another stretch of desert.
Through a combination of diplomacy and accidental external factors, the chiefs obtained an Imperial protectorate which was extremely favourable to them. The British were more concerned to keep European rivals out than to intervene in detail, with the result that for several years the only effect of the protectorate was to protect against Afrikaners. Again southern Tswana country was transferred to the Cape while the north (apparently by accident and lack of interest) remained a separate political entity.
Course of collaboration
The severest test of Khama’s diplomacy began in 1889. Rhodes’ British South Africa Company had been formed for the purpose of getting and exploiting the area which became Rhodesia and the Company was anxious to secure rights and privileges in Bechuanaland Protectorate as well. The Imperial Government was apparently willing to allow the Company to do so. From Rhodes’ point of view it was desirable to secure non-imperial control over the Protectorate, so as to facilitate communications between his base at the Cape and his extension into Rhodesia , and in order to reduce the risk of imperial interference in his rather dubious activities.
First, a telegraph line was run through the protectorate in 1890 and then a railway line began to approach the Protectorate’s southern border from Cape Town in 1894. Rhodes’ conquest of the Ndebele in 1893 with some assistance from Khama’s people was also a portent for the future. The Tswana chiefs had not invited the British in merely to make room for Rhodes’ colonization schemes, though they had no objection to Rhodes as an ally against the Ndebele.
In 1894 Rhodes submitted a formal request to the Imperial Government for the right to administer the Bechuanaland Protectorate; and it looked as if the Imperial Government might agree. On the other hand a sizeable body of missionaries in South Africa and in Britain, impressed by Khama’s religious attitudes and his claims upon the Imperial Government, protested against Rhodes’ proposal.
Results of collaboration
• Khama set off to London in 1895. He was accompanied by Sechele of the Bakwena and Bathoen of the Bangwaketse, and reinforced by a letter signed by themselves and by Lentswe of the Bakgatla. In London, the new Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was apparently willing to accede to Rhodes’ proposal and to hand over the whole protectorate to the Company, on the same terms as it administered and controlled Rhodesia itself. However, in the face of the protests of the chiefs, he agreed to compromise so that each chief and his people would have a demarcated reserve, while the remaining area, of which the most important was a thin strip of country running parallel with the Transvaal border, was handed over to the BSA Company.
• It was not a perfect arrangement, but it did preserve the status quo in most of the protectorate and it got rid of direct company control over most of the Tswana. It was clearly an advantage to the chiefs that so little of their country was suitable for white pastoralism, and that all of the country was so important in colonial strategic terms.
• Thus two reasons sum up how the Tswana chiefs managed to become British-Protected persons on relatively good terms. External circumstances were favourable to such a decision, and the diplomatic skills of the chiefs in seizing their opportunities were even more crucial.
• Chief Khama was converted to a Christian and for this reason he was able to acquire British support.
• The British support enabled chief Khama of Ngwato to expand his kingdom against the Ndembele in the north and boers in the east such that he was able to bring the goldmines of Tati Region under Ngwato control.
Activity 5.5
In groups of five, look for History books and historical journals in the library. From these, look for information on;
1. How Rwanda reacted to colonial rule.
2. Give reasons for the reaction.
3. Analyse the consequences of the reaction.
4. Write down your findings and present them in a class discussion.
Unit summary
This unit looks at the reception and reaction that the Europeans colonialists got in their different territories in Africa. The arrival of European colonialists in Africa was received in two major ways which are; collaboration and resistance.The Africans who resisted the coming of the European colonialists include the Fulani, Banyoro, Hehe and Ndebele people.
The African communities who welcomed the Europeans and collaborated with them include; the Wanga, Maasai, Baganda, Lozi and Ngwato people.
Unit assessment
At the end of this unit, a learner is able identify and assess the methods and effects of resistance and collaboration in Africa and make a judgement on which method worked best between the two.
Revision questions
1. What do you understand by the following terms?
(a) Resistance
(b) Collaboration
2. Discuss any five African communities who collaborated and those who resisted colonial conquest.
3. Who was Nabongo Mumia? Why did he collaborate with the British? What were the consequences of his collaboration?
4. Why did Lewanika of the Lozi collaborate with the British? Highlight the main events of that collaboration.
5. Discuss the reasons for Samori Toure’s downfall in his resistance against the French occupation of Mandinka.
6. Describe the establishment of Portuguese rule in Angola and the nature and extent of African resistance to it down to 1898.
7. Describe the course of Maji Maji resistance.
8. (a) Describe the circumstances leading to the Hut Tax War of 1898 in Sierra Leone.
(b) Write briefly on the course of the Hut Tax W
Not wishing to show commitment too early, Sekou employed delaying tactics, and stalled Gallieni for ten months. To force an answer, the French occupied Kita, inside Sekou’s territory. Continuing his diplomatic game, Sekou gave the town away and agreed to give French the ‘most favoured nation’ status in trade. But he rejected the demands in their original wording.In October 1881, he travelled to St. Louis to have his interpretation of the agreement ratified. When his mission failed, he repudiated the treaty and remained free for nearly two years, as the French were still pre-occupied with securing the Senegalese base.
At the outbreak of Franco-Prussian war and subsequent defeat of the French in 1871, the French garrisons were withdrawn from the Ivory Coast. French interests were left in the hands of the merchant firm of Arthur Verdier. Treaties were signed in which the French merchants were given trading rights in return for an annual tribute to the coastal chiefs. Verdier honoured the treaties and sold his goods from the Grand Bassam and Assinie.The major markets were in the interior, to which coastal people carried French goods and where the products of the savannah and of the forest, as well as the gold of Asante, were exchanged. Between 1887 and 1889, the French negotiated similar tributary treaties with the forest chieftaincies and as far north as Kong in the savannah. By the treaties the French bound themselves not to interfere with African customs, land tenure and or government.In occupying the area the French took no time at all to violate the treaties. They adopted the tactic of using the chiefs to sign treaties and then eliminating them in order to set up direct administration.They demanded slave porters, meddled in the election of chiefs, and dispatched two military expeditions to strike at Samori in the north, which failed partly as a result of the hostile opposition. This especially came from the especially of Baoule people. In retaliation Samori sacked Kong, France’s ally and by this the French were proved vulnerable and more groups joined the Baoule in harassing them. The colony was however, established in 1893 and French control seemed well-established by 1900. In 1908 Angoulvant became Governor of the Ivory Coast.He was a man who was determined to be tough and who attributed French humiliation to the softness of his predecessors. He began a policy of systematic military conquest with the purpose of disarming the population.
Jaja refused to sign these treaties as he saw them as potentially ruinous to his middleman’s position and to the sovereignty he had achieved with such effort. He also took a militant stand against missionary entry into his country.He was determined not to end up like the king of Bonny whose warm embrace of European religion and support had reduced him to a spineless puppet in European hands and an embarrassment to his people. They began to solicit government support in gaining entry into Opobo. Many of the traders who had previously supported Jaja also now turned against him because he had held a firm monopoly of trade along his rivers and excluded them from the profits of the hinterland markets.The British decided to move against him, firstly, to forestall the French intervention, and secondly to break Jaja’s middleman’s position and political arrogance. Jaja decided to relax his militant stand. In company with the other rulers of the ‘Oil Rivers’ signed a treaty in 1884 designed to give the legal basis for a British protectorate.
Macdonald was driven to be more decisive. in September 1893, he recognized the need to campaign against Kabalega. Owen was authorized to prepare an advance from the south while Macdonald gathered his forces for the main attack. In November, Colonel H. E. Colvile arrived to take over from Macdonald with instructions to check a rumoured Belgian advance into the British sphere in the direction of the Nile.Macdonald’s proposed campaign fitted in well with these orders and Colvile took command of the expedition, which consisted of the Sudanese troops together with a vast number of the Baganda. The advance began in December 1893. Within a month Kabalega’s capital near Hoima was occupied. Although the Mukama continued to wage a guerrilla campaign for nearly a year he was finally driven to take refuge north of the Nile in November 1894.
In these struggles against the British, the Nandi had a number of advantages from their environment. Firstly, their country was mountainous and broken by numerous rivers, many of which had steep, heavily wooded valleys. Secondly, large areas were covered with thick forest containing glades where cattle could graze, as well as deep holes where they could be hidden. These conditions were ideally suited for guerilla warfare and allowed both men and animals to be hidden. Big guns could not be used in these conditions and even the effectiveness of rifle power was reduced.The maintenance of unity among the Nandi was moreover encouraged by the appointment of Orkoiyot Koitalel arap Samoei, to direct the war against the British. Samoei’s reputation and influence increased between the Nandi and the neighbouring people as warriors’ raids were regularly successful. Successive punitive expeditions left without forcing the Nandi to make peace and all attempts to capture them were frustrated. The British Officer in Nandi, Captain Richard Meinertzhagen was convinced that if the Orkoiyot were killed the resistance would be broken. He therefore arranged a meeting with Koitalel arap Samoei at the Orkoiyot’s home in October 1905. A stage-managed scuffle took place at the meeting and the Orkoiyot and most of his Maotik (advisors) were killed.
Throughout, however, Mumia’s fighters joined them. By 1906, military expeditions had been successfully completed against the Nandi, Nyang’ori, Sotik, Luo (Ugenya, Sakwa and Seme) and the northern Luyia (Bukusu and Banyala).